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CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW
Major questions in the life of
nations are settled only by force .
^
Lenin
The figure of Lenin is undoubtedly one of the most prom-
inent of our century. The architect of the October 1917 rev-
olution, the founder of the Soviet state, an inspiration to
countless revolutionaries throughout the world over this last
~century
,
his actions and writings have left a deeper
mark than perhaps any other man in recent history. Yet his
reputation bears the same ambiguity as that of a figure such
as Napoleon: is he a true hero, or an arch-villain? Is he
one of the Great Men of history, or a dictator who threatens
the future of democratic civilization? This essay does not
propose to answer such questions as these (if they can, in-
deed, be answered by any one person or time), but rather seeks
to examine those features of Lenin's writings (and the cor-
respondence or non-correspondence of his deeds with those
writings) which propelled him into a position of such extraor-
dinary influence in recent times. The focus of this essay
will be on the vanguard party -- why is it necessary, why
does it take the particular organizational form it does, what
is that organizational structure? Involved in this discussion
will be an examination of Lenin's ideas concerning the role of
1
2consciousness, the function ol the state, the limits of dem-
cratic reform, and trade unionism (for without an understand-
ing of these issues the "why" of the party will remain un-
clear)
,
as well as an examination of those ideas more direct-
ly related to the party itself: who can be a party member,
what are his duties, and what are the organizational prin-
ciples of the vanguard leadership?
Besides being important for an understanding of the
history and politics of Soviet Russia and many other revolu-
tionary parties, a study of Lenin is important because of his
special relationship to Marx — after all, is not Lenin a mem-
ber of the communist trinity? One sociologist has gone so
far as to call Lenin the "St. Paul" of Marxism, for without
his successes in Russia, Marxism may have "become no more
than just another social doctrine in the history of ideas.
Lenin made sure this would not be the case through his trans-
lation of the economics of Marxism into a revolutionary tac-
tics of power — that is, into a politics of Marxism with no
2holds barred." Though many would strongly argue that Marx's
social criticism stands firm quite independent of Lenin's
accomplishments, there is a measure of validity to this thesis
in that it is now often difficult to totally and clearly sep-
arate Marxism from its Leninist formulation and the Soviet
experience. For many, the political and social environment
of Soviet Russia is inevitable in any socialist-communist
3society and characters such as Lenin and Stalin (who are often
considered interchangeable) are fated to possess the offices
with the greatest power. Such a position, however, equates
Marx with Lenin and Lenin with Stalin, an indentif ication
which is certainly exaggerated. Though Stalin will not play
a role in this study, it is hoped that those ideas which
separate Marx and Lenin (as well as those which bind them)
will be recognized and their importance for political action
noted
.
Being a revolutionary
,
Lenin dealt with questions which
exclusively "Leninist" and offered social analyses
pertaining to both industrial and agricultural societies,
analyses which still have relevance seventy to eighty years
after their original publication. For example, Lenin spent
a great many pages throughout his career in railing against
the establishment of democratic rights and freedoms by the
monarchy and liberal bourgeois parties as nothing but a mock-
ery of true democracy and an attempt to ensure the continu-
ance of class domination. To an American reader such words
seem preposterous and are adequate evidence of Lenin's un-
democratic and dictatorial character: how can a democrat
possibly argue against the establishment of democratic free-
doms? To a Palestinian or black Rhodesian, however, such a
warning may be more understandable. Though the debate in
these lands over self-rule is not explicitly made in Leninist
terms, many opposition groups seem to share Lenin's concern
4that as long as state power remains in the hands of a ruling
minority (be it ethnic, economic, or racial), no democratic
reform can possibly bring about actual rule by the people,
i.e., the majority (class). Somehow, some way, the law will
be written, circumvented, or amended to maintain minority
privilege. Perhaps in thinking of these more modern examples
Lenin's writings will be more easily returned to their envi-
ronment of Tsarist Russia and will thus revive the more dif-
ficult (and his original) question of the relationship be-
tween class privilege and democracy, rather than the "non-
issue" of "Is not Lenin seeking power for himself and his
party rather than true democracy for the people?".
Another example of an issue developed by Lenin which
maintains its immediacy today (and which may be more readily
understandable in the United States) is the issue which has
3
come to be labeled his "theory of labor aristocracy". Sum-
marily, this theory holds that because of the "super-profits"
reaped from the exploitation of imperial colonies, the cap-
italist class has the resources to "bribe" a section of the
working class (Lenin usually held that this section consisted
of the leaders of the "bourgeois trade-unions"), thus split-
ting that force which was to overthrow the capitalist order
and usher in the socialist society. Lenin long held that
trade-unions were a conservative organization, as they con-
cerned themselves primarily with economic, not political,
issues. Moreover, those unions which were best organized
5came to forsake their revolutionary destiny and sought to
maintain their relative position of privilege (relative to
the other sectors of the working class)
,
thus supporting the
capitalist political-economic system. Though popular feeling
in the United States towards trade unions has been much more
favorable than that of Lenin, many people today have increas-
ing reservations about "big labor"
. Do the largest unions
really represent their members? Do they represent the work-
ing class? Have they renounced an adversary relationship in
favor of a cooperative relationship which may favor some union
members in the short run, but does little for those workers
who are non-unionized, or those workers in relatively weak
unions? Are they not a part of "labor"? What will the
management- labor relationship be in the future?
These are all interesting and important questions, but
they are not the immediate focus of this essay. In raising
them we wish only to demonstrate further reason for studying
Lenin and his ideas, reasons which more directly affect our
own political environment. The links between the questions
approached by Lenin and political questions in our own time
listed above could easily be expanded, but this would only
further detain us from a more detailed analysis of his theory
of the party and revolution in his own environment of imperial
Russia. Though we do not intend to address all of the ques-
tions raised above, we hope that through this analysis the
reader may be able to recognize in the writings of Lenin
6situations similar to those in the world today and thus come
to acknowledge the continuing relevance of his writings.
Whether or not one agrees with Lenin's position on all these
matters, or with the recommendations he makes for political
action, one must acknowledge that the "burning questions" he
asked and answered in this particular way — are not as
yet extinguished.
attempting to understand Lenin, or to explain his
thought to another, one is faccsd with a rather difficult task
because of the often contradictory nature of his thought and
'''^^itings. One would like to be able to start an essay with
a statement to the effect that Lenin is above all an orthodox
Marxist or a democrat, but Lenin is much more complex than
this. Is Lenin an orthodox Marxist, or is he a political
realist willing to make theoretical concessions and revisions
if the moment warrants it? Is he a man seeking true equality,
justice and freedom, or does he seek a society where those
values will be impossible to attain? Does he have real con-
fidence in the proletarian class as the creators of the so-
cialist society, or does he have such little faith in it that
he organizes a vanguard party to "guide" the working classes?
At no time is it a simple "either-or" situation. Throughout
the forty-five volumes of his collected works there is much
to be found in support of both sides of each question; it is
the task of an essay such as this to attempt to reflect the
7proper balance of these attitudes. Hopefully this effort
will have some success, however limited it may be.
It would not seem to be the most promising approach to
the study of any individual to presume that a study of his
early life and personality is sufficient to explain all of
his later beliefs and actions. There is simply too much
information unavailable to the student which would be neces-
sary for any sort of adequate understanding via that method.
Undoubtedly what we call the "formative years" are precisely
that, but holding that one's youth directly determines all of
one's later actions seems to ignore the influence played by
one's later experiences or by whatever power of reason man
possesses
.
At the same time, neither does it seem sensible to
ignore whatever insights may be gleaned from an individual's
history. In noting such influences, however, one must admit
that though they may have been influential, they are not
causally determinate. Thus, for example, we may note the
relationship between Lenin's marked distrust (and even
hatred) of the Liberals, and the fact that when his brother
Alexander was executed for an attempt to assassinate Tsar
Alexander II, the Liberals v/ith v^hich Lenin's family had been
friendly abandoned them and made them semi-outcasts in their
own town. Rather than being a family respected by the com-
munity, they now had few friends daring enough to visit.
8Lenin's widow, N. K. Krupskaia, traced his attitude towards
the Liberals to this experience in his youth/
From Wolfe s fascinating work on Lenin in Three Who
Made a Revolution
,
we gain a picture of an intelligent, happy
youth growing up in a somewhat prosperous household. He always
did well at school, excelling in Latin and history. He was
said to have been a good-natured youth, though at times a bit
mischievous. He was, by most accounts, an intelligent young
man with a promising future in the law.
IVhen he was sixteen years old, his brother Alexander,
as was just noted, was executed for his attempt to assassinate
the Tsar. Some would point to this as the starting point of
Lenin s revolutionary career and claim that he was, in a sense,
seeking to avenge his brother
' s death in plotting to overthrow
the Imperial regime. Though his brother's death was surely a
factor in the politicization of the young Lenin, to picture an
individual planning personal revenge for twenty-five years is
to picture some sort of neurotic, but this is certainly not
Lenin
.
(One individual who has attempted to explain Lenin's
career in terms of his childhood experiences is Wolfenstein in
his psychoanalytic study The Revolutionary Personality . This
is an interesting work, but its conclusions and evidence are
far from conclusive. Like all psycho-biography it is limited
both by the paucity of information available and by the in-
ability of the author to sit down in extended interviews with
9the subject. Although such studies are stimulating and not
without value, it is interesting to note that one such at-
tempted by Freud himself — "Dostoyevsky and Parricide" --
has recently been convincingly attacked by Joseph Frank in
his lengthy biography of Dostoyevsky.^
One of his most notable characteristics is the serious-
ness with which he adopted and approached his radicalism. In
his maturity it seemed as if he lived for, and thought about,
only the Revolution. In her memoirs, Kruspskaia writes that
Lenin gave up chess and Latin because they were too absorbing
and distracted him from his work. There is also the famous
story in which we hear Lenin saying of music -- while lis-
tening to a Beethoven sonata which he considered the most
beautiful work of music ever created (the Appassionata) —
"I can't listen to music too often. It affects your nerves,
makes you want to say stupid nice things and stroke the heads
of people who could create such beauty while living in this
vile hell. And now you mustn't stroke anyone's head — you
might get your hand bitten off. You have to hit them on the
head without any mercy".
^
As this remark demonstrates, there was much bitterness
on Lenin's part towards the world in which he lived (even
though he had been a rather privileged member of his society
- his father had achieved a rank bearing hereditary nobil-
ity^)
,
which is perhaps not surprising considering the ex-
traordinary dedication he brought to his work. One would.
10
indeed, find it difficult to understand why Lenin brought
such a high level of energy to his revolutionary activity, to
his life activity, were it not for his total rejection of
capitalist society. He was a man who worked for the benefit
of the lower classes and who demonstrated a sincere apprecia-
tion of their company. He had an appreciation of culture,
but never sought luxury for himself. He was a man of simple
means (he was once almost killed when his bicycle was hit
by a truck while he was riding to a party meeting) and genu-
inely worked for the movement and the socialist society, not
for personal gain. It was a dedication which engulfed both
his public and private lives — his private life became pol-
iticized to such a degree that compatability and personality
in human relationships were judged secondary to allegiance to
Lenin's political positions. For example, though Lenin had
practically idolized Plekhanov until the early 1900 's, after
they had an argument concerning who would control the party
newspaper, Lenin wrote in a letter that one must "regard all
persons 'without sentiment'; to keep a stone in one's sling"
The political life permitted few non-political relationships.
His activism is amply demonstrated in his writings and
'^^^iting style. While a few of his works, such as The Develop-
ment of Capitalism in Russia
,
Im.perialism, the Highest Stage
of Capitalism
,
State and Revolution, etc. are concerned with
social analysis and theorizing outside immediate political
considerations, the great bulk of his writing is agitational
11
in character, with titles such as What is to be Done?, "Where
to Begin?" or Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic
Revolution
. Unlike the former writings, these books, articles
and pamphlets are cluttered with references to the most obscure
newspapers, journals, and political actors who were in Lenin's
day important personalities on the Russian political scene.
No issue was too small, no point of contention too insignifi-
cant, that he would not jot off some sort of note carefully
explaining its sense, or nonsense, from a Social-Democratic
(i.e., Leninist) point of view. One cannot read much of
Lenin's writing without becoming immersed in all the squabbles
of the Russian revolutionary movement.
His style of writing, too, reflects his political char-
acter: detailed, persistent, and aggressive. Even in such
a scholarly work as Imperialism
,
Lenin never fails to take
advantage of an opportunity to point out the clumsiness,
cowardice, or stupidity of his opponents, and then in no
uncertain terms. Haimson, in comparing the style of Lenin
with that of Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, had
this to say;
In both speeches and writings, Lenin goes imme-
diately to the attack, breaks up his opponents'
statements into parts, from the very start lit-
erally surrounds them with his own interjections
or statements, and hits out time and time again.
Plekhanov 's arguments have the economy and inci-
siveness of a rapier; Lenin's the brute strength
of a club.^
Supplementing this comment, Meyer adds that one may have
trouble with Lenin's style unless one understands that he
12
"writes as he speaks, and he speaks like a stump speaker".
And a stump speaker he was - unable to carry a crowd by the
force of his eloquence (as was Trotsky, for example), he was
the consummate politician, pacing the floor for delegate votes
before the start of any party congress. Many delegates were
disappointed in first seeing such behavior from the great
leader Lenin, expecting a grand entrance with his entourage
followed by a fiery and compelling speech. This was not,
however, Lenin's style.
To understand Lenin's politics one must recognize two
influences; the intellectual atmosphere and revolutionary
heritage of 19th century Tsarist Russia, and the tremendous
impact on him of the political and economic writings of Karl
Marx. Lenin was a product of both these influences, and he
contributed new elements both to revolutionary strategy and
the political analysis of the liberal-capitalist state.
The intelligentsia in Russia, of which Lenin was a
member, had a generally Western, liberal outlook and formed
a very distinct segment of society. The absolute monarchy
was looked upon as an archaic political structure, and the
modern revolutionary tradition could trace its roots to the
1825 attempt on the life of Nicholas I by a liberal group now
known as the Decembrists. Looking to the West for those polit-
ical forms and social ideas which would bring Russia into the
modern age, the intelligentsia v/as, in its own view if not in
reality, cut off from the mainstream of Russian society.
13
Because of its isolation -- what Wolfe called "damned-up
thought social thought tended to have an extremist fla-
vor. A new age was upon Russia and it would be created by a
new man, a man committed to social and economic equality.
Though the intelligentsia hardly understood the real concerns
and goals of the peasantry, the latter was considered to be
the social force which would overthrow the monarchy and in-
stitute a socialist-type state. This populism dominated the
revolutionary imagination for most of the 19th century, de-
veloping its own form of revolutionary organization and
strategy, which v;as in many ways similar to that developed
by Lenin. With the growth of industry and capitalist pro-
duction in Russia in the late 19th century, however, the
influence of Marx began to be felt in the revolutionary
analysis of society.
Russia was, even at the time of the 1917 revolution,
the most backward of the Great Powers. Primarily an agri-
cultural country, heavy industrialization began as a state
policy in the late 19th century as a means to assure the
continuing power of the Russian state. The labor supply for
such industrialization was bountiful, primarily because the
Tsarist government had discouraged expansion to the unpop-
ulated lands of Siberia and because agricultural production
had not yet taken advantage of new machinery and methods in
Russia — there was simply not enough land to meet the grow-
ing agricultural population. This oversupply of labor was
14
especially marked in southern Russia, creating working con-
ditions which rivalled the horror stories of the industrial-
ization of England. The working classes in the south tended
to be fluid — laborers viewed factory life as only a tempo-
occupation which would be abandoned when they could again
obtain a productive plot of land — and unskilled. In north-
ern Russia and Poland (in St. Petersburg, for example) the
labor supply was not as abundant and the working classes be-
came more stable, skilled, and organized, which made for bet-
ter wages and working conditions. Though unions and strikes
were illegal, there had been some labor legislation in the
1890 's aimed at lessening some of the excesses of the indus-
trial workplace. Later it would be these most skilled and
best paid workers who would be the most politically active
12
members of the laboring classes.
With the growth of industry and the working class,
revolutionary thought went through a transition from Populism
to Marxism. The future of Russia was now seen not in terms
of an agricultural, communal society, but rather as an indus-
trial, socialist state. The newborn working class was not
the revolutionary messiah.
Marxism found success in Tsarist Russia for a number of
reasons: first, it was a compelling critique of the capital-
ist system of production; second, its "scientific" character
was found by many to be more appealing than the more romantic
Populist scenario; and third, its revolutionary flavor fitted
15
well the strong anti-government sentiment of the intelligen-
tsia. The first great Russian Marxist was George Plekhanov,
1 who, along with Paul Axelrod, Vera Zasulich and Leo Deutsch,
formed the first Russian Marxist party in the early 1800's.
Lenin joined the party and began contributing to its litera-
ture in the early 1890 's, when he was in his early twenties.
Though the political environment of Imperial Russia was
I
I
not excessively liberal, neither was it as excessively illib-
eral as the present Soviet regime. The politics of Marx —
the theory of class struggle, the proletarian revolution and
,
dictatorship, the establishment of the socialist and finally
communist state, etc. -- was not tolerated, with censorship
I
and criminal punishment vigorously enforced in these matters
I
(though some would claim that punishment for political crimes
j
was quite mild, with treatment being similar to that received
today at "prison farms" in the U. S. ) . The economics of
i
I Marx, however, — the historical analysis of the production
I
I process, the analyses of the individual production systems
I
I
(factories) and the social organization of the production
process — was permitted and this was the focus of the early
I
Russian Marxists: scientifically establishing the argument
I
that capitalism existed in Russia (and was, in fact, growing)
I
' and that the Marxist schema of history was applicable in this
I
,
primarily agricultural society. Thus, though it may at first
i
I be puzzling, it is understandable hov; someone as political
i
and agitational as Lenin could publish as his first book a
I
I
I
I
1
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statistics-laden worl. such as The Development of Capitalism
in Russia. Many, including Marx himseli (with the exception
of some comments of his which seem to support a contradictory
conclusion) had presumed that Russia was light years away
from that level of objective development which would make a
socialist revolution possible. It was thus the goal of the
early Marxists to establish, with studies such as Lenin's,
the fact that Russia was now an industrial country capable
of spawning a proletarian revolution.
Lenin entered revolutionary circles as a Marxist, and
he claimed allegiance to that framework — or at least to
his own understanding and interpretation of it — throughout
his career. Though not all of Marx's writings were available
to Lenin in his lifetime, whenever he took a theoretical or
strategic position he always sought to demonstrate its affin-
ity with the Marxian outlook, using the words of Marx as the
ultimate determinate of the correctness or incorrectness of
one's own or one's opponent's stand. Such an attitude re-
flects the firmness with which Lenin believed in the scien-
tific character of Marxian social science and the inevi-
tability of "scientific socialism". Yet, if Lenin had done
nothing but repeat to a Russian audience the ideas of Marx
and Engels he would be of little interest today. What is so
fascinating and important about Lenin is how he adapts and
re-molds the work of Marx into something which, though in-
comprehensible without Marx, is different from Marxism, as
17
it perceives different problems in the development of social-
ism. Proclaiming in theory the inevitability of the Marxian
vision, in practice, Lenin's Social-Democratic (Bolshevik)
Party — his most original contribution — seems to operate
on the assumption that socialism will not spring forth inev-
itably, but that it is the role of the Party to make possible
and actual "the inevitable"
.
Because of Lenin's stature
as a Marxist, and more importantly to be able to understand
the world vision within which he operates, it is necessary
for us to outline Marx's ideas on the course of history and
the fate of capitalist society.
CHAPTER II
MARX AND LENIN
Marx, like Hegel, found Reason in history, though he
did not perceive it in Hegelian terms such as Absolute or
Universal Spirit. Rather, Marx and Engels came to under-
stand society as the creation of those laws — no less
universal than the laws of natural science — which govern
the formation and development of all societies: the inter-
relationship between the mode of production and the social
structure and ideas which protect and develop that mode of
production. Rather than viewing society as the product of,
or realization of, abstract ideas (be it the recognition of
freedom as the true purpose of history, or of democracy as
the only legitimate form of political organization)
,
that
same social structure and series of ideas (now recognized
as ideologies) are now seen as the product of a mode of pro-
duction, a set of social relationships which make civiliza-
tion and security possible, but which also demand a series
of particular social relations and social ideas which do
not disrupt that social stability which makes production
possible in the first place. Social thought is not auton-
omous, but rather serves the needs of a particular system
of production. The role of technology, then, becomes the
most important in any society, as its level is the greatest
influence on the course of social thought and structure.
18
19
Marx does not deny, howt'ver
,
any influence at all to
religious, political, or philc>sophical theories. They may
very well, as in the case of leligion or social thought in
late 18^^ century France, lag behind changes in the economic
system of a society and demands made by that system and thus
have to be forcibly overthrown, as happened in revolutionary
France. Or, more importantly, if one came to recognize
those ideologies which support a system as ideologies and
one understood why they were created and what purpose they
served, one could truly understand the system of production
of a particular society and restructure it in a v;ay which
required no ideologies and false consciousness to maintain
it. Though man is an object of history -- he is shaped in
a world created by others -- he is also an active subject
who can take a role in re-creating his v/orld. As Alfred
Meyer writes in his book on Marx: "By uncovering the forces
determining human conduct, they (Marx and Engels) sought to
make man, the object, conscious of his subjugation to his-
torical circumstances, so that he might emancipate himself
15
and become the sovereign maker of history".
It is this dual nature of man -- as subject and ob-
ject — which later led to the first important splits in the
socialist parties, for the aspect one emphasized greatly in-
fluenced the character of one's political activity: if man
is primarily subject, political action (i.e., revolution)
will be emphasized; if he is primarily object, action need
20
not be emphasized as political and economic change will be
evolutionary and inevitable. r/lany see these implications in
the writings of Marx himself, as they point to a supposed
split in his own thinking on this question. Until the rev-
olutions of 1848, these critics claim, Marx had emphasized the
revolutionary nature of the coming proletarian upheaval. After
the failure of these movements, however, it is claimed that
Marx eschewed the course of revolution in favor of a more
gradual, but equally successful, path to socialism which
utilized the liberal-democratic freedoms of vote, speech,
organization, press, etc. Though it is true that Marx did
believe socialism may develop naturally in some of the most
advanced capitalist nations, he never claimed that this was
the natural course for all nations. Still, such a position
is perhaps implicit in his historical materialism and was
later developed by the first Marxian revisionists.
Having noted that society is an organization making
possible a means of production, it must next be noted that
this production was in Marx's view always a class system
because of the social division of labor, at least until the
system reached that level of efficiency and productivity
which no longer demanded such a division of labor. The
original division of labor, however, was based not on skill
and merit, but on force and thievery -- this was the so-
called "primitive accumulation". With the development of
capitalism, the principle class struggle shifted from one
between an aristocracy and serfdom to one between the owners
21
of capital and laborers. In some cases (England, for example)
the ruling class remained lartpily the same, as the hereditary
aristocracy was willing to take a leading role in this tran-
sition. In other cases (France, for example) the aristocracy
was unwilling to take the lead in such "menial" labors as
manufacture, so they were eventually violently displaced as
the ruling class.
Capitalism made tremendous strides in the process of
production, but it also created tensions within itself which
required resolution. For example, though capitalism was ever
expanding its output, it was also, in Marx's view, constantly
creating a more polarized social structure, as the techno-
logical demands of production demanded larger and larger
units of production, thus moving towards a system of monopoly
capital in which fewer owners possessed ever-greater amounts
of capital and in which the working classes grew more and more
populous. Moreover, as profit comes only from the exploita-
tion of human labor (not machinery)
,
and as industry was be-
coming more capital (i.e., machinery) intensive because of
increasing technology and competition (that is, human labor
as a percentage of capital investment was decreasing)
,
wages
to workers could not rise, as that would restrict the very
life-blood of capitalism (i.e., profit). Furthermore, in
needing to teach workers to read and write, to operate com-
plex machinery and bear arms in their modern armies, capi-
talists were preparing workers to take over the operation of
society themselves.
22
Politics and economics, Lhcn, could not be understood
without an understanding of class relationships, and class
was determined by one's position in the production process
(am I a large capital owner? a small capital owner? the owner
of only my ability to be a wage earner?) Classes were fun-
damentally selfish, concerned only with its particular class
interest, and only when there no longer existed any classes
(when there is only one class that term becomes meaningless)
would exploitation cease. History was perceived not in terms
of a struggle between different nations, or leaders within
nations, but as the expression and development of the class
struggle. A ruling class ruled only for its own benefit and
continued domination and would never willingly concede its
advantages. History, though it proceeded inevitably, was
fought in a series of revolutionary upheavals (not always
violent) which altered the structure of domination within
society. History in its conventional sense, however, was to
end with the proletarian revolution because this moving force
in history — class conflict — would cease to exist. The
dialectic of history would finally come to rest as society
would no longer be internally contradictory.
The final aspect of the Marxian outline of which we
must speak is its conception of the state. Picturing society
as an organization brought about to produce goods, thus as-
suring man's mastery over nature, it is obvious that one of
the most basic requirements of civilization is a certain
23
degree of stability which allows such production to go on
v\7ith a minimal amount of disruption. The most ideal society,
then, would be one possessing a natural harmony — all seg-
ments of the population would be voluntarily cooperating to
assure the smoothest and most efficient mode of production
possible. Yet, as we saw, Marx viewed all of history (includ-
ing modern capitalist times) as the product of class strug-
gles, as the creation of battles between the differing class
interests within a production system and society. How, then,
in the midst of these struggles, does such a degree of order
reign which makes possible large-scale production? To Marx,
the responsibility for creating this social order belonged
to the state. Thus, the existence of the state in itself
presumes disorder within society (class conflict)
,
and also
points to the artificial nature of the state as an attempt to
bind those internal conflicts raging within a society. In
the truly harmonious society the state would be incomprehen-
sible, for the functions it performs — and performs with
force -- would in the "natural" society be carried out vol-
untarily. Moreover, a state, by this definition, necessarily
seeks to maintain the dominance of the ruling class, as it
seeks to maintain an environment in which the current mode of
production can continue to function. In maintaining a par-
ticular system of production the state also maintains the
power of that class which dominates that system. Thus the
state is not that neutral body which it so often claims to be.
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but is rather an active participant in the class struggle.
Without recognizing this distrust felt by Marxists towards
all governmental institutions, a distrust which was perhaps
felt even more deeply by Lenin, one may be unable to fully
understand the abhorrence with which Lenin viewed the Tsdrist
government, and the suspicion with which he viewed any of its
concessions. in playing its role as "justice of the peace"
in the struggle between the capitalist and proletarian classes,
the state was by no means an impartial judge, but was implic-
ated in every injustice committed by the ruling class.
The ideal society would be one in which class distinc-
tions had disappeared as there would no longer be a distinc-
tion between those who owned the means of production and those
who did not all individuals would be in the same relation
to the system of production: workers who contributed to the
production process and reaped its benefits to the same de-
gree; no longer would individuals be able to exploit others
for private advantage. At the same time that these class
distinctions disappeared, the state itself would "wither away'
the divisions which split society vanished, that orga-
nization which was to soften that split (i.e., the state)
would cease to have a purpose. Society would now be a nat-
ural organism, held together not by the force of a state,
but by the unity of interest of all its members. Marx wrote
little about the specifics of this new, socialist society.
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though Lenin did author a book in the summer of 1917 (The
S^te and Revolution ) which dealt primarily with this subject.
It is perhaps his most uncharacteristic work, being
primarily hypothetical and, arguably, utopian. Under the so-
cialist state here envisioned by Lenin, the socialist "bureau-
cracy" would have the following characteristics: all employ-
ees of the "state" would receive the same wages; all jobs
would be open to all citizens; there would be no careerism;
bureaucrats would be subject to recall; there v/ould be a vol-
untary centralism. Whether such an organization is at all
possible is highly debatable -- what, for example, happens to
expertise in bureaucratic structure? Is it so easily acquired
that any citizen will be able to perform his duties, however
complex, as well as any other citizen? Is expertise compati-
ble with a system which includes recall for its bureaucrats?
The final end of society is equality for all citizens.
Few would argue against such a goal. Yet there are two types
of equality sought by various political groups; equality of
opportunity and equality of result. Lenin (as well as Marx)
was a proponent of the latter. In The State and Revolution
he defined Communism as that "which gives to unequal individ-
uals, in return for an unequal (in reality unequal) amount of
work, an equal quantity of products". As it is important
to understand how Lenin viewed the state to understand many
of his political decisions and positions, it is equally im-
portant to understand the general outline of his social
vision If one is to make any sense of his attacks on liberal
democracy. Surely the debate between these two types of
equality is not an easy or decided one. Lenin felt equality
of opportunity to be a fraud which merely perpetuates the
present class structure; there could not ^ real equality of
opportunity without equality of result. If individuals can-
not receive the same advantages as others in their upbringing
(which assumes quality of result)
,
can one speak of true
equality of opportunity? On the other hand, equality of re-
sult seems to require a gigantic state apparatus -- certainly
not a structure appealing to Lenin -- to ensure that no per-
son exceeds the accepted level of wealth, power, or whatever.
Moreover, many would reject such a system as it offers the
same advantage to the industrious and responsible as it does
to the lazy and irresponsible.
With the growth of industry in Russia, then, the writ-
ings of Marx and Engels grew rapidly in influence. Marxist
parties were not, however, all of the same mind. The last
thyears of the 19 century were good ones for capitalism:
imperialist expansion had greatly strengthened the capital-
ist economies and the predictions of Marx that these eco-
nomies would go through a series of increasingly severe
crises and soon collapse seemed to be proving themselves
false. Rather than seeing the growing size and emiseration
of the working classes, rather than witnessing a withdrawal
of democratic freedoms in order to protect the ruling
2interest of the capitalist class, throughout Europe the
livelihoods of the working class seemed to be improving.
Trade unions were growing, waijes were increasing (however
slightly), labor legislation was beginning to address the
problems of the factory environment, and there was an exten-
sion, not a contraction, of liberal democratic rights. In
1899 a leading German Social Democrat, Eduard Bernstein
(who had been the literary executor of Friedrich Engels)
Published his Evolutionary Socialism
,
which began the surge
of "revisionist" Marxism. Bernstein claimed that Marx had
made a series of mistakes and that rather than marching to-
wards self-destruction, capitalism was gradually and non-
violently progressing towards socialism. According to this
theory workers should not organize to overthrow capitalism,
but should reap the benefits from it, benefits which will
grow as capitalism blossoms into socialism. The theory,
though condemned by the great majority of Marxists, quickly
had an important influence on the practical politics of the
socialist parties of Europe. As Bertram Wolfe writes: "The
reason for Bernstein's hidden triumph lay in the changing
intellectual climate of Europe. His trivial remarks on eco-
nomic trends could not stand up against Marx's Capital ...
Yet Bernstein's views exactly suited the prevailing mood of
Europe as the nineteenth century set and the twentieth rose
17bright with promise"
.
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Paul Axelrod, however, one of the leaders of the Men-
shevik faction, had a different explanation for the attrac-
tion of Bernstein's revisionism. In a fascinating letter to
Plekhanov, Axelrod wrote that
I look upon Bernstein's articles as one of the
manifestations and logical or psychological con-
sequences of this manque de foi in the progres-
sive movement of humanity, more correctly, as a
complete lack of faith in it . . . if one already
takes the point of view that relegates humanity
to the eternal condition of cattle, not admitting
its elevation to the state of full rationality,
then the philistine-tortoise movement recommended
by Bernstein has a certain superiority over the
methods of Sturm und Drang; at least less blood
flow and there will be less reason for en-
tire nations to give themselves airs to the same
degree as has been attempted by the French. 18'
Rather than appealing to the optimism of the new century,
then, Axelrod was critical of Bernstein's writings for re-
nouncing the implicit optimism of Marxism and accepting a
much more modest future. (In this same letter Axelrod said
that the distinction between Bernstein and an "ultrarevolu-
tionary" comes down to a "question of temperament".^^)
The revisionists major political reformulation was to
forsake revolution. Having faith in the growth of capital-
ist economies, they advised workers to emphasize the econom-
ic, not political, aspects of the class struggle. They pro-
moted the growth and strength of trade unions and advocated
agitation primarily on matters such as wages and factory con-
ditions and only secondarily on questions such as constitu-
tional assemblies and universal suffrage. (For this reason.
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in Russia such revisionists were called Economists.) More-
over, according to the Economists, workers were to be organ-
ized according to trade, not class. It was in his incessant
tirades against these revisionists that Lenin made a name for
himself and began to develop and refine his own positions on
revolution, the party, and politics.
CHAPTER III
THE VANGUARD PARTY: LENIN vs. REVISIONISM
It is certainly Lenin's conception of the party — its
structure and responsibilities — which most accounts for
the attention he receives today. However Lenin envisioned
the party, however democratic he had hoped it to be, it
seems impossible now to speak of the "vanguard party" with-
out the shadow of the Soviet Communist Party falling over
such a conversation, though this is perhaps as it should be,
as Lenin was the main architect of that party. Yet, in
reading what Lenin had to say about the party — that it was
to combine the efficiency of centralization with the social-
ist demand for democracy -- one comes away feeling that this
rigid, totalitarian state organization is not what he had
originally envisioned.
What, then, were its failings? Are centralism and
democracy incompatible? In v/riting about the centralist-
democratic state, for example, Lenin says that "Centralism
does not ... in the least exclude such wide local self-
government which combines a voluntary defense of the unity
of the state by the 'communes' and districts with the com-
plete abolition of all bureaucracy and all 'commanding' from
20
above". Does this not ring of federalism? Is it that
Lenin was willing to allow more lower-level autonomy in the
state than he was willing to allow in the party?
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Did Lenin expect too much cooperation between all
members of society once the capitalist system had been de-
stroyed? He often wrote of voluntary centralism" as if it
were something to be taken for granted. Did he place too
much faith in the power of class interest and in the natural
harmony of interest once classes have become a quickly for-
gotten relic of the past? Should this possibility lead us
to distinguish between the centralist-democratic revolution-
ary party (where the combination of centralism and democracy
may emphasize the former, as classes are still existent and
the party finds itself in a hostile environment where strict,
military-like discipline is necessary for survival) and the
centralist-democratic party in the socialist state (which
would emphasize the latter, as private interest would equal
social interest and all citizens would become active in the
operation and maintenance of the "state". Centralism would
still be a guiding principle of the party, but such central-
ism would be largely voluntary)
?
Hov; is it that someone who so consistently calls one-
self a democrat — as Lenin did time and time again through-
out his speeches and writings — would come to place such a
high value on centralism? After all, doesn't one expect to
surrender a certain amount of central direction and state
authority when one adopts democracy, in return for a greater
degree of self-determination for all members of the society?
Is there not an element of distrust in democracy which
I
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rejects the claims of anyone - be they philosopher-king or
chairman of the Central Committee — to know what is in the
best interest of someone else? Is it democracy when, after
reaching a decision through "democratic'' discussion and pro-
cess, a Central Committee can chose debate and demand com-
pliance with that decision? where is there recourse for the
minority? How is the original "democratic" debate assured?
But, to return to our original question: from where does
this compulsion for centralism arise?
A great influence, it must be acknowledged, is the less
than secure position which the Bolshevik party possessed in
Imperial Russia. Its on-again, off-again legal status; its
revolutionary character; and its underground organization
gave the party a character quite amenable to military analogy.
In fact, Lenin himself was fond of such metaphors and often
termed the party the "general staff" of the revolution. In
a single paragraph of his short article "Where to Begin" he
uses the following terms: "forms of military action ...
juncture in the battle . . . state of the troops
. . . operation
for the army in the field . . . occasional attack unrelated to
any army
. . . most active fighters
. . . staff of leaders . .
.
regular military operation ... assault columns ... etc."^^
Though this paragraph is exceptional for the use of such
language, there can be no doubt that he felt that he was
leading a military operation (though from a particular po-
litical perspective) against the Tsar. There existed a great
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need for secrecy if the party was to survive, and only a cen-
trally directed leadership could offer the necessary amounts
of secrecy and organization.
Another influence contributing to his partiality to-
wards centralism was more personal in nature. Several stu-
dents of Lenin have noticed a pair of related characteristics:
his cast of mind generally leaned toward bureaucratic thought
(Walzer sees him as a modern-day Calvinist, preaching order
and organization amidst the chaos of Tsarist Russia) and
his impatience with what he saw as needless haggling over
minor details. Wolfe sees this characteristic as growing out
of Lenin's exile experience and the endless arguments with
which political exiles filled their days. Conquest saw this
same tendency as a reaction to the "inefficiency and wooly-
mindedness of the Russian intelligentsia".^^ Whichever of
these explanations is most correct, Lenin did have a great
admiration for the advantages to be gained from strong orga-
nizational discipline and sought to build such advantages
into his party structure.
Like Marx, Lenin drew a close connection between theory
and action. "Without revolutionary theory," he wrote in What
24Is to Be Done?
,
"there can be no revolutionary movement."
Having consciousness, one would proceed to create that world
where all could be free. To Lenin, consciousness was not
primarily a consciousness of those repressed wishes and de-
sires motivating one's actions (a la Freud), but rather a
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consciousness of the flow of history and of one's true posi-
tion in that tangle of social relations which constitutes an
economic system. As we noted earlier, each productive system
has a series of social ideas (Ideologies) which are fostered
by that system and which are necessary for its maintenance.
(For example, feudal production needs a stable labor force
bound to the land and a rigid social structure. Capitalist
production, on the other hand, requires a more mobile labor
force and a social structure which allows more upward and
downward mobility. Each economic system will produce a
social and political philosophy responsive to its needs.)
Such ideologies, however, represent their social structure
as natural and just, thus masking their actual origins and
the real nature of social relations. It is not only the
proletariat who are deceived by these ideologies, however.
It is not the case that the ruling classes actually under-
stand the nature of class relationships in capitalist society
but keep such knowledge to themselves -- they are just as
much victims of the v;eb of ideology fostered by the system.
All members of society live under a false consciousness, a
misunderstanding of their actual role in society and their
just claims to the products of that society.
Any true worker's party must thus be led by the most
advanced theory, by the most class-conscious theory, if it
wishes to be successful in its efforts to overturn the pre-
sent social structure and to organize the just society. A
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true worker's consciousness would recognize the illusoriness
of liberal-bourgeois political concepts. Any attempt to set
up the socialist state without breaking free of these con-
cepts would be doomed from the start, as it would be carried
out within capitalist categories of social thought. Accord-
ing to Marx, this necessary level of consciousness would de-
velop spontaneously as the contradictions of capitalism be-
came more obvious and the failings of its political ideol-
ogies became more apparent. As history marched on, as the
working class grew larger and poorer, as the crises of cap-
italism grew more frequent and more severe, the working class
would finally come to see the real character of capitalist
production and the true roles played in that process by each
segment of society -- capitalist, middle class, and proletar-
iat. At last fully conscious and enlightened, the working
class would assume its historical destiny, overthrow capital-
ist production and create socialism.
As we saw, hov/ever, capitalism at the turn of the cen-
tury was not fulfilling these prophecies. Rather, trade
unions, labor legislation and political reform seemed to be
strengthening the position of the working class and there
seemed to be arising not a revolutionary situation, but a
situation in which the working class was ever more recon-
ciled to its position within a growing capitalist economy.
It was in facing this new development that Lenin made his
most important revision of Marx's writings and claimed that
"the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to
develop only trade-union consc;iousness
,
i.e., the conviction
that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employ-
ers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary
labour legislation"
. It was to counter this "trade-union
consciousness" that Lenin created the vanguard party.
In 1902 Lenin wrote one of his most important works,
^at Is to Be Done?
, which for the first time outlined his
theory of the vanguard party and criticized at length the
Economists (trade-unionists) both for their failure to lead
the masses with conscious theory and their bowing down to the
spontaneous desires of the working class. In this book, Lenin
never ceases attacking the notion that working class con-
sciousness (i.e., socialist consciousness) can develop spon-
taneously and that trade unions — which organize workers
along trade lines for benefits in the economic sphere (i.e.
,
approach social relations in capitalist production in terms
of employer vs. employee, not capitalist vs. proletariat,
which more clearly denotes their political — class — re-
lationship) — can benefit the working class movement polit-
ically was well as economically. Further on in What Is to
Be Done?
,
Lenin writes that "the spontaneous working-class
movement is trade-unionism
. . . and trade-unionism means the
ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie".
What does Lenin mean by "the ideological enslavement of
the workers"? In effect, he means the maintenance of false
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consciousness. Workers, when organized as a trade union, ap-
proach the bargaining table (which in itself is a terrible
mistake, as the ruling class will never willingly surrender
its domination) with liberal bourgeois concepts (e.g., that
there is no exploitation of the worker because he is being
paid a day's wage for a day's work, or that equality before
the law - and that is always an equality in principle, not
practice -- is equal to full human equality, or that each
laborer is a free and equal member of the economy because he
IS free to sell his laboring ability to whomever he chooses),
thereby helping maintain that system of thought which supports
capitalist production. If the workers had consciousness of
their class destiny and the true nature of social relations
in their economic system, however, if they came to see that:
the wage earner is in fact being exploited (that he is being
paid not for the full value which he creates each day at the
factory, but rather only that amount which is necessary to
keep himself and his family healthy enough to work) ; that
political equality is only formal equality as long as the
laborer, in contradistinction to the capitalist, must work
long, hard hours of deadening work in an unhealthy environ-
ment in order to obtain even the most rudimentary food, shel-
ter and clothing for himself and his family; that only in ex-
traordinary times will the laborer have much, if any, choice
as to whom he will work for, and that at any rate that which
he creates, that most important and human of all activities.
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IS both out of his own control and alienated from himself;
only if the workers finally acknowledge these realities will
they be able to break free of that social structure which re-
stricts them. Yet, as we see, the working class will only
be able to break the chains that bind them when they have
broken the chains of bourgeois ideology and political thought.
Sharing with Marx the convictions that class structure
and class conflict were the most important aspects of social
structure and that only theoretical knowledge of this struc-
ture brought the power to change it, Lenin split with Marx
in his estimation of the ability of the masses to naturally
develop such knowledge. Though Lenin had a greater natural
affection for the working classes and peasants than did Marx,
he also undoubtedly had a greater distrust of them as re-
gards their revolutionary vigor and stamina (or, perhaps be-
cause of his closer relationship to the lower classes he had
a greater understanding of the temptations facing them)
.
Yet, if all classes are strangled by ideology, and the
working class (whose destiny it is to overthrow the present
social structure and establish the class-free, the ideology-
free, society) itself cannot break these intellectual fetters,
how are the bonds of ideology ever to be broken? Seemingly
we are all enslaved by the categories of thought on which we
are nourished and these are, in turn, reflective of the de-
mands of the economy. Fortunately, however, there is a class
which is able to break through these bonds and demonstrate
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to the masses the ideological nature of capitalist social
science and social structure: bourgeois intellectuals. Marx,
too, had spoken of the communists in his Communist Manifesto
as "the most advanced and resolute section of the working-
class parties of every country", but he drew this distinction
? 7less sharply than did Lenin.
By virtue of thought, the intelligentsia is able to
leap out from their particular class background and gain a
disinterested view of society. By means of their education,
through the study of the science of dialectics, through re-
flection on social problems, intellectuals are able to break
free of the time-bound ideologies of capitalist societies and
discover the importance of, and future direction of, class
consciousness, and help direct the proletariat to that higher
level of awareness. It was this group which was to form the
heart of Lenin's vanguard party, the party which was "to make
the proletariat capable of fulfilling its great historical
. „
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mission"
.
Why was it that the working class, despite the optimism
of Marx, could not spontaneously develop class consciousness?
There are three major reasons why Lenin felt the need of a
vanguard party: the problem of ideology; the difficulties
each segment of the working class had in developing an aware-
ness of their affinity with other segments of the v/orking
class (which speaks more directly to the problems of trade
organization and geography than to the larger problem of the
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development of class consciousness per se) ; and the problem
of imperialism and the matter of "bribes" made possible by
the "super-profits" extracted from imperialist colonies.
The issue of ideology is one which we have already
mentioned. In a report to a Soviet Congress in 1918 (thus
after the revolution, when consciousness was supposed to
have already been a reality)
,
Lenin stated that "the habits
of the capitalist system are too strong; the task of re-
educating a people educated in these habits for centuries is
a difficult job which requires a lot of time. But we say:
Our fighting method is organization. We must organize every-
thing, take everything into our own hands". Ideology was
the most subtle, but perhaps the most powerful, of the forces
working against consciousness. It set the boundaries of
social thought, and social thought in turn sets that range of
actions open to us. It is so difficult to dislodge because
it is so difficult to perceive. It is so difficult to dis-
lodge because it is reinforced through every policy decision
of the government, through the daily teachings of the edu-
cational system, through the cooperation of the working class
(in the form of trade unions) in capitalist production, and
through every day in which present social relations are re-
enacted and reinforced. Undoubtedly it would only be with
great effort -- and guidance from the conscious vanguard --
that members of the proletariat would be able to clearly
understand social reality, an understanding which would be
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untainted by the class-interested, ideological categories of
bourgeois social thought. "The role of the vanguard fighter
can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most
advanced theory."
The danger posed by a political party such as the Eco-
nomists (Russian revisionist Marxists) was that it ignored
this theoretical aspect of the revolutionary struggle. As
we shall see, Lenin conceived of this struggle as operating
along three complementary fronts: the theoretical, political,
and economic. The Economists were guilty of fighting along
only one of these fronts (the economic) and were thus con-
ducting a less-than-wholehearted effort on behalf of the
working class. In fact, their battle plan assured the con-
tinued domination of the capitalist class, as the economic
struggle was the most narrow and least important of the rev-
olutionary fronts. A failure to advance revolutionary theory
maintained the dominance of bourgeois ideology, which in turn
means an extended life for capitalism. If there was to be
any protest at all (and how, with its internal contradic-
tions, can that ever be avoided in a capitalist system?), the
government would greatly prefer it to be along economic lines,
for "economic concessions (or pseudo-concessions) are, of
course, the cheapest and most advantageous from the govern-
ment's point of view, because by these means it hopes to win
the confidence of the working masses. For this very reason,
we Social-Democrats must not under any circumstances or in
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any way whatever create grounds for the belief (or the mis-
understanding) that we attach cfreater value to economic re-
forms, or that we regard them as being particularly imper-
il 31tant
. Surrendering the ideological struggle, any "con-
cessions" negotiated by the Economists, though they perhaps
improve in the short-run the living and working conditions
of the proletariat, would only assure the continued domina-
tion of the minority capitalist class.
(Parenthetically
,
it seems important here once more to
remind the reader of Lenin's conception of the state in cap-
italist society, or comments such as the one made in the par-
agraph above "concessions most advantageous from the gov-
ment s point of view" — may }iot be totally understandable,
^i^st, as a Marxist, Lenin held that the function of the
state is to maintain the current "class balance of power"
which nourishes the current mode of production. The state
— government — thus benefits most the ruling class, and in
remaining loyal to their system of production seeks to main-
tain their dominant status. Secondly, the path of industrial-
ization in Russia was different from the path followed by
industrial nations in VJestern Europe and America. To an
extent unmatched in these latter countries, Russian indus-
trialization was encouraged and directed by the national
32government. As a result, the relationship between busi-
ness and government was seen in Russia as much closer than
it was understood to be in capitalist societies where private
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business dominated the economic; sphere. For this reason, the
political nature of economic rcjlations was obvious to Lenin,
and he spoke of the government and business leadership as
virtually interchangeable.)
In portraying the world as one in which private property
IS sacred and inviolable; as one in which all participants in
the economic system enter that system as free and equal mem-
bers, distinguished only by the commodities (skills, resources)
which they bring to the market; as one in which all have an
equal chance to succeed with the right amount of hard work; as
one in which employer and employee stand in a contractual,
though not social or political, relationship to one another;
as one in which private profit serves the social interest
in painting these and other illusions, bourgeois ideology seeks
to justify the existence of capitalism and to disguise the
true roles and interrelationships of the classes in capitalist
society. In creating and maintaining these illusions, more-
over, it creates a false sense of self and purpose for the
proletariat class. Rather than becoming cognizant of them-
selves as a class, as a class in a series of particular re-
lations with other classes, as a class with an "historical
mission" and revolutionary destiny, bourgeois ideology paints
the picture not of class conflict between proletariat and
capitalist, but a purely economic conflict between an indi-
vidual employee and an individual employer. Until the pro-
letariat rejects this manner of thinking about social and
economic relationships it will remain the object of capital-
ist domination.
The second major obstacle to proletarian, socialist
consciousness was the problem of trade organization and geo-
graphy. As long as workers continued to associate and or-
ganize themselves according to their trades and/or according
to local matters of concern, c^ consciousness would re-
main only a possibility instead of a reality. in Lenin's
eyes the workers were, as Meyer phrased it, "involved in
sectional and national interests and loyalties"
. With a
working day of IIJ^ hours, it was the rare man or woman who
had the energy (and often times the daring) to spend their
free time campaigning for economic and political change.
Having little knowledge of the working conditions of other
laborers, it is not surprising that when workers finally did
protest, it was over matters with which they were better in-
formed than anyone else and over which they were most con-
cerned: their own working conditions, wages, and relations
to the employer . This was a large part of the reason work-
er's naturally emphasized the economic side of the struggle,
but as Lenin wrote:
The economic struggle is the collective struggle
of the workers against their employers for better
terms in the sale of their labour-power
,
for bet-
ter living and working conditions. This struggle
is necessarily a trade-union struggle, because
working conditions differ greatly in different
trades, and, consequently, the struggle to improve
them can only be conducted on the basis of trade
organisations ...34
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Such a position is dangerous, however, because, as he wrote
in a paper concerning the agrarian question in 1920:
SLorica^''^®^
workers cannot fulfill their world-
voV^ i
^ mission of emancipating mankind from they ke of capital and from wars if these workers con-cern themselves exclusively with their narrow craft
t^caL and® and smugly confine themseL^s
time^
concern for improving their own, some-s tolerable, petty bourgeois conditions. This is
advanced countries to
+-ho
aristocracy" which serves as the base of
national^35
parties of the Second Inter-
Issues which were most important to a particular factory,
industry, or region solely occupied their interest, and they
were therefore unable to see their unity in opposition to
capitalism with laborers in other industries and regions
which shared the same class relationship and interest, but
had superficially different issues of primary concern (i.e.,
economic concerns). Or, for example, some workers may suf-
fer from a bourgeois sense of arrogance, and skilled workers
may thus come to regard themselves as being of another class
than unskilled workers, even though both stand in the same
relationship to the capitalist class.
A second function of the vanguard party (besides its
theoretical leadership)
,
then, is its effort to broaden the
political outlook of the working class, to demonstrate the
similarity of interest between all opposition groups:
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We must take upon ourselves the task of oraanisina
o? oir'p^r^v ?ead^rsLp^ Pa ty in such a manner as to make it oossihic^for all oppositional strata to render their fullestsupport to the struggle and to our Party. We mustrain our Social-Democratic practical worker? to be-
mLi!
riah? ?
this all-round struggle, able at the
tion" fo^^h^
dictate a positive programme of ac-
^ aroused students, the discontentedZemstvo people, the incensed religious sects, theoffended elementary schoolteachers, etc., etc. 36
Along with a concern over the political implications of
organization according to trade, Lenin was also interested in
the proper relationship between national and local opposition
organizations. In fact, one of the five chapters of What Is
—-
Be Done ? was devoted to an explanation of why an all-Russia
political newspaper would be of much greater value than a col-
lection of local publications which are (supposedly) more in
touch with a locality's most pressing social questions. The
argument here is basically the same as that relating to as-
sociation by trade: too great an interest in parochial mat-
ters disguises the unity of interest in more universal areas.
"It is positively beyond the strength of a separate local
organisation," he writes, "to raise its newspaper to the
level of a political organ maintaining stability of prin-
ciples; it is beyond its strength to collect and utilise suf-
ficient material to shed light on the whole of our political
life." What must be emphasized are not issues particular
to a locality, but those which are universally of interest
to the working class.
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Not only does ci locally based revolutionary effort
lack the overall viev; necessary for a class political move-
ment, It IS also more inefficient, even at what it is sup-
posed to do best — local organization! Lenin defends this
claim by stating that with proper organization, a national
newspaper would be able to more effectively handle local
concerns than would a more regional body which possessed
much smaller and less efficient resources.
The vanguard, then, brings together all the members of
the revolutionary movement. First educating them as to the
importance of class structure in any society, it then moves
on to an appraisal of the present class alignment — who
stands where? On whose side do the "aroused students, the
discontented Zemstvo people, the incensed religious sects,
the offended elementary schoolteachers" stand? Without the
leadership of the vanguard in explaining these class rela-
tionships, the proletariat class would never recognize its
class status and would remain a series of disunited segments
of the population.
The third major obstacle to proletariat class conscious-
ness was an outgrowth of Lenin's study of imperialism — that
the "superprofits" expropriated from colonial lands made pos-
sible "bribes" to a portion of the working class, thus split-
ting the proletarian movement — and to a degree is related
to the problem mentioned above: organization according to
trade. Though he never devoted an entire work exclusively
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to the study of this "aristocracy of labor", its relevance is
still felt today in discussions concerning the labor move-
o p
ment.
Writing his book on imperialism in 1916, Lenin viewed
It as the most significant social development in the last
thirty-five to forty years. Marx certainly would have taken
note of It had he lived long enough to witness its appearance,
but as he had not, it was Lenin's task to analyze its import
and make the appropriate emendations in socialist policy.
Stalin claimed that Lenin was so accurate in his understanding
of the political implications of imperialism that it could be
said that "Leninism is Marxism in the age of imperialism".^^
Though Lenin made few new contributions to the work already
done by researchers such as Hobson and Hilferding, his anal-
ysis was fundamental to his political strategies.
Imperialism involves the political and/or economic
domination of one nation by another, a phenomena which can
easily be traced back to Egyptian times. Forms of imperial-
ism, however, change with time, and the form with which
Lenin was interested in was the imperialism of finance capi-
tal. Why had capitalism not fallen, regardless of its inter-
nal contradictions, even a half-century after Marx had pre-
dicted its impending collapse? Why did it appear that the
laboring class seemed to be prospering, rather than becoming
weaker both economically and politically? Why was not the
falling rate of profit (a "law" relating the intensification
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of machinery as percentage of capital expenditure - a
percentage which was rising throughout Europe — to a nec-
cessary fall in the average rate of profit) putting ever
greater constraints on the ability of capitalism to function?
The answer was, Lenin found, that the extraordinary profits
reaped from its colonial empires was keeping the capitalist
ship afloat.
Capitalist imperialism is merely a stage of capitalist
development, but it is also the final stage. Following that
unexplainable (to bourgeois economists) series of financial
crises that plagued capitalist economies throughout their
history, the ownership of capital was falling into the hands
of fewer and fewer persons. With the growth of this monopoly
capital, overall social planning was increasing, which made
capitalism more efficient, but this was only a transitional
stage on the path to state capitalism, which in its turn was
one step closer to socialism. At the level of monopoly cap-
italism, however, having rationalized the system to the
highest degree possible while keeping capital in private
hands, the contradictions of capitalism have merely been
allayed, not solved. Some way had to be found to relieve
the pressures of underconsumption at home, excess capital,
and working class dissatisfaction. Lenin believed that cap-
italism found such relief in opening up colonial markets and
workshops which provided a new market area for domestic goods
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and a labor force which was plentiful and amazingly inexpen-
sive. Most important, from tliis abundant labor could be
drawn astounding rates of proJ it (remembering that profit
can come only from human labor and that it is the difference
between the value created by (.he laborer and the value paid
him for creating that value, which in this case translates
into a colonial laborer being paid only the smallest fraction
of the value he creates through his laboring).
Having these "superprofits", capital was able to lit-
erally purchase the acquiescence of a segment of the working
class the most successful trade unions. (Having faith in
the eventual victory of the proletarian revolution, Lenin
was never precise in explaining how large a segment of the
proletariat would be open to bribery, but the general im-
pression one gets is that this portion of the labor movement
would not be large enough or influential enough to hold off
the revolution indefinitely. Today, writers departing from
Lenin's hints about this "aristocracy of the labor movement"
tend to empower it with greater political significance.)
Thus, we see Lenin write in Imperialism, the Highest Stage
of Capitalism:
The receipt of high monopoly profits by the
capitalists in one of the numerous branches of
industry, in one of the numerous countries,
etc., makes it economically possible for them
to bribe certain sections of the workers, and
for a time a fairly considerable minority of
them and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie
of a given industry or given nation against all
others. 40
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These remarks of Lenin on trade unions, trade organ-
izations, relates closely to our previous remarks about
Lenin's feelings about association by trade vs. association
by class. He realized that there could be advantages to
worker organizations of this type (e.g., political education,
agitation, contacts with other worker's groups), but he re-
mained generally suspicious of their true nature and motives
throughout his lifetime. In fact, he even considered the
trade-unionists/Economists to be a more sinister enemy than
the Tsar, for they posed to be something that they certainly
were not, i.e., socialists. He long was interested in the
history and implications of trade-unions — he had translated
one of the major works written on British trade unions ( In-
dustrial Democracy
,
by Sidney and Beatrice Webb) -- but was
tireless in his critiques of them.
According to Marxist theory, wages can rise above the
level of necessity only when: a.) profits rise above the
average level (e.g., with superprofits from imperialist ex-
pansion) or b. ) if the law of supply and demand can be af-
fected so that supply cannot naturally meet the level of
41demand. From the capitalist point of view, an increase
in wages is an investment in labor stability; from the union
point of view any wage increase makes life easier. Capi-
talists, then, will seek out superprofits while unions will
try to control the labor flow (and thus influence wages) by
demanding that companies hire only union people, with the
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union determining who will, and who will not, be allowed
union membership. These were usually the oldest, most es-
tablished unions — unions which were finding their way in
the bourgeois world. They sought not to challenge that
world, but to make their fortune in it. As Engels wrote of
such unions in 1892, "they form an aristocracy among the work-
ing class; they have succeeded in enforcing for themselves a
relatively comfortable position, and they accept it as final".
Involved here are two treacherous crimes against the
working class: an attempt to maintain and enhance their own
privileged status vs. the majority of the working class and,
more importantly, accepting their status as "final", that is,
renouncing their revolutionary mission. Certainly not all
trade unions were of this sort, but this desire for security
above justice was implicit in each one. Not all unions
,
how-
ever, could hope to reach such status -- the well of super-
profits runs only so deep. As capitalism develops unevenly,
so too do the various trades, and technology can eventually
play the role of phasing out a trade, even a trade with a
powerful union not all trades can afford powerful unions
at the same time. (In recent years this seems to be the
case with one of the historically most powerful unions in
America, the typographical workers. With improving tech-
nologies it is becoming possible to operate printing ma-
chines with many fewer workers, and negotiations between
newspapers and typographical unions have been struggling
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over the trade-off of better pay for fewer workers, a strug-
gle which has greatly weakened the power of the union.)
In accepting the higher wages being offered by capital-
ist imperialism, trade unions were, in effect, becoming ac-
complices in the exploitation of laborers — not necessarily
themselves or their countrymen, but the laborers in colonial
lands, as it was only through their exploitation that capital
had the resources for these higher wages. Capital was, then,
turning segments of the proletariat not only within nations
against each other
,
but also the proletariats of various na-
tions against one another, for an imperialist bourgeois trade
union maintains its privilege at the expense of the colonial
proletariat. If that colonial proletariat strikes out for
its freedom it also strikes out to end the privileged status
of bourgeois trade unions. Thus, although Lenin would not at
first believe it when told that the German workers had voted
for war credits, they (workers in unions, at least) could be
understood to be voting to protect whatever security they had
gained
.
Trade unions, then, were becoming "social chauvinists",
that is, collaborators with one's own national bourgeoisie in
the exploitation of other nations. It was now ... the alli-
ance of a small section of privileged workers with "their"
national bourgeoisie against the working-class masses; the
alliance between the lackeys of the bourgeoisie and the
43bourgeoisie against the class the latter is exploiting.
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Trade unions gave up the ideological and political
struggles in exchange for economic concessions. Not only did
they delay the development of class consciousness, they ac-
tively subverted it. In splitting the working class between
an "aristocracy of labor" and a "real" proletariat; in
adopting, rather than rejecting, bourgeois ideology; in work-
ing in concert with their capitalist class against the rev-
olutionary struggles of the proletariat of other nations; in
accepting their positions in society and rejecting their rev-
olutionary destiny -- in these ways trade unionism traduces
the worker's movement. Trade unionism was, in effect, a pros
titution of the working class.
At the same time, the economic struggle was an aspect
of the revolutionary movement. Lenin was not against higher
wages for workers or better and safer working conditions —
in fact, he was very much supportive of those demands. These
economic demands could not be made, however, independent of
political change and without an effort to expose the ideo-
logical character of bourgeois social thought. Apart from
these other equally important demands, economic benefits are
of only little value. Wage increases are of little value in
a land where political oppression and social inequality are
the rule. It must be remembered that Russia did not have any
truly national representative legislative body until 1907
,
and the principle of legislative supremacy, or popular sov-
ereignty, was not fully recognized until after the October
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Revolution. Lenin and most of his colleagues had undergone
some sort of political imprisonment. Autocracy was the
heritage of the Tsardom, and Nicholas li tried hard to fol-
low in the footsteps of his forebears. The suffrage, even
late as 1917, had never been more than limited. The re-
lationship of true Social-Democracy to trade unionism, then,
IS one Which demands not only economic reform but also po-
litical. The bourgeois trade unionists must be cut off from
the proletarian revolutionary movement, unless their economic
Struggle could be politicized:
The task of the Social-Democrats
... is not
political agitation on an eco-nomic basis; their task is to convert tSe-
lUicafsr^^*'?'''® Social-Diiocratic po-
poli?iL? the sparks of
s?rnon?e
consciousness which the economicSt uggl generates among the v/orkers, forthe purpose of raising the workers to thelevel of Socral-Democratic political con-sciousness . 44
Economic struggle alone was too narrow, bourgeois, and
spontaneous - workers who lacked proletarian class conscious
ness were leading the class astray (i.e., along the bourgeois
path). Rather than le_ading and guiding the worker's move-
ment, trade-unionists floundered at the tail of the spon-
taneous (i.e., non-conscious) masses. in a sense, Lenin's
opposition to the trade union movement boiled down to an
attack on spontaneity. it was Lenin — the conscious member
of the vanguard, conscious of the course of world history,
conscious of the importance of class relations, conscious
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of the balance of those relations in capitalist society, con-
scious of the importance of the struggle against bourgeois
ideology vs. the bourgeois" trade unions — unconscious
of all of the above and prepared to sacrifice the true po-
litical, economic and social claims of the proletariat in
exchange for a few paltry economic "pseudo-concessions".
To Lenin, spontaneous action is short-sighted, oppor-
tunistic action which sacrifices the historical role of the
working class in return for short-term benefits which are
themselves restricted to minor advances in only the economic
sphere. As long as spontaneity charted the course of the
worker s movement, the goals of both individual laborers as
well as the laboring class itself were determined in accord
with the prevailing bourgeois ideology. Worker's were thus
willing to continue toiling away in the factories which ex-
ploited their labor-power, were willing to allow the con-
tinuance of political and class domination, were willing to
allow the continued operation of an inefficient and unjust
system, if only they were paid a better price to do so.
Conscious action, on the other hand, is primarily con-
cerned with the long-term results of its activity. Unlike
spontaneity, it is active (not reactive)
,
creative (it has
a sense of mission and is not intent on mere destruction,
as is spontaneity)
,
and willful (not capricious) . Having
an awareness of its historical mission, conscious activity
forsakes the appearance of short-term benefits for the
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££5iity of the proletarian revolution and socialist future.
It is a path which demands discipline, but which assures
lustice. It is action which requires struggle on all three
levels of the socialist front:
economic. Such a combination
sistently (in Lenin's opinion)
Bolshevik
.
theoretical, political and
of elements was offered con-
in only one party: the
At the same time, however, Lenin was ready to play
upon the spontaneous desires of the masses if it served the
(political) interest of the party. During the crises of the
provisional government during 1917
, Lenin's party took up
the popular slogans of the masses in order to bring them-
selves into power, though they had not been official posi-
tions of the Bolshevik party:
The vast majority of peasants, soldiers, and
workers are in favor of a policy of peace.
This is not the policy of the Bolsheviks; it
IS not a "party" policy at all; but it is thepolicy of the workers, soldiers, and peasants,that IS, of the majority of the people. We
are not carrying out the program of the Bol-
sheviks, and in agrarian matters our programhas been taken entirely from the mandates of
the peasants.
One should not misinterpret the position of the trade
unions, however. Though they did reject revolution as a
feasible strategy, they were not excessively fond of either
the capitalist class or the capitalist system. In a time
when political protest was not encouraged, they sought the
path of least resistance"
^ , i.e., that type of protest
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and organization which would be looked upon with least dis-
favor (for the monarchy was not enthusiastic about political
discontent, to say the least) by the government, thus allow-
ing the movement to grow and consolidate itself. (m fact,
the government itself secretly got into the trade unionizing
business in an attempt to control the movement. That it was
a government organized union which had gotten out of control
which was the group involved in the Bloody Sunday protest -
the spark that ignited the revolution of 1905 — speaks to
the failure of that policy.)
Though the unions were not as political as Lenin may
have wished, neither were they as un-political as he claimed,
though their politics and Lenin's were certainly not identi-
cal. Perhaps the greatest difference between Lenin and the
unions was not that the latter were non-political, but that
their politics were bourgeois, basically meaning that the
unions were willing to compromise on political issues.
Lenin could never think in this way. For him there could
be no bargaining, no negotiation. Class conflict was "ir-
reconcilable"; there was no sense in trying to compromise,
for Lenin was demanding an end to bourgeois ideology and
class domination by the minority, demands which would never
be accepted as long as the present state functioned.
As late as 1905 (when he published Two Tactics of
Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution amidst the
revolutionary turmoil of that year) Lenin had held, in
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accord with the Marxian forecast and in agreement with the
Mensheviks, that the coming revolution would inevitably be
bourgeois, establishing the unfettered dominance of the
capitalist class. This would, in turn, lead to an inten-
sification of class conflict and the development of those
social and technological conditions necessary for a social-
ist revolution (e.g., adequate industrial strength; a large,
literate, conscious proletariat class, etc.), still, the
socialist revolution could not come in Russia for many years
With time, however, Lenin (though not the Mensheviks) came
to see a way in which Russia could skip this period of hour-
geois control and move directly from a semi-feudal society
to a socialist one: the Russian revolution would set off a
world-wide revolutionary conflagration, Russia then being
able to survive economically, despite its backwardness, with
the help of its more advanced comrades. Until this time the
split between Bolshevik and Menshevik factions had been
largely limited to organizational questions; now it also
enveloped the issue of whether or not a country which did
not itself possess the objective conditions necessary for a
socialist revolution could successfully establish a socialist
society. The Mensheviks continued to maintain that without
the development of the objective conditions, a socialist
revolution was premature. Lenin, on the other hand, felt
that with the growth of international socialism the coming
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revolution in Russia could be transformed from one bourgeois
in character to one socialist in character.
Yet, all the obstacles to that revolution which we have
noted -- bourgeois ideology, local organization, trade union
consciousness, the illusion of freedom and equality in lib-
eral democracy still remained in the path of the prole-
tariat. It was to battle these obstacles that Lenin sought
the political, organizational and theoretical leadership of
the vanguard party. "Our fighting method is organization,"
he wrote, "We must organize everything, take everything into
47our own hands". Refusing to ever soften his revolutionary
stance, and assigning such a critical importance to the issue
of class revolutionary consciousness, Lenin created the van-
guard party to assure the success of his socialist vision.
and in doing so caused one of the most controversial splits
in the history of Marxist (and world) politics.
The split within Russian Social Democracy over the
structure of the party commenced with the publication of
Lenin's What Is to Be Done ? in 1903. It was here for the
first time that he dealt at length with the problems facing
revolutionary Marxism (primarily the continuing growth of
trade unions and concentration of interest on the economic
struggle) and proposed the vanguard — consisting of class
conscious, full-time, professional revolutionaries — as
a necessary guide to proletarian class consciousness and
revolutionary action. Originating as a dispute over the
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requirements for membership in the Russian Social Democratic
Party, it would be years before the full implications of the
split between the Bolshevik (the Russian word for majority)
and Menshevik (minority) factions as to party structure (and
the implications of such structure) were recognized. And it
would be the popularized understanding of Lenin's theory of
the party that of a small, dictator ially controlled elite
seizing power "in the name of" the masses — which would most
determine his reputation in our country. Though there is
perhaps an element of truth in this version of Lenin's theory,
it is not truly reflective of the party structure as he de-
veloped it in his writings.
The vanguard party was to supply two major types of
leadership: theoretical and organizational. Though one
would initially suspect that theoretical leadership would be
of greater importance because of its role in bringing about
revolutionary political consciousness, this was not the case,
for having gained class consciousness it was still the mis-
sion of the proletariat to win political power, which was no
easy task in the Russia of the twentieth century with its
extensive secret police and modern army. That the prole-
tariat was as strongly organized as the autocratic power
and that it operated at highest efficiency to most fully
utilize its resources — this was an equally important goal
of the vanguard leadership.
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we have already noted the importance of conscious
political knowledge: only conscious individuals could re-
cognize the importance of class structure and the nature of
class oppression; only conscious individuals could decipher
the meaning in the history of class struggle; only conscious
individuals could foresee the future course of the capitalist
dialectic which was spinning ever faster towards the prole-
tarian revolution and the victory of socialism; only con-
scious individuals would have the will and strength to over-
throw the political and economic systems which enslaved them.
Yet how to assure this level of consciousness was the problem
facing Lenin. What could be done if "the history of all
countries shows that the working class, ... by its own ef-
fort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness",
could not have been Social-Democratic conscious-
ness among the workers" if they were left to themselves?"^^
For Lenin the solution lay in that advanced group of "class-
conscious fighters" who, having broken free of bourgeois
ideology
,
would lead the workers to the freedom of true
knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the capitalist class struc-
ture and the proletarian mission)
.
The working class would first of all have to be po-
liticized. Spontaneously developing a concern over only
economic issues, its horizons would have to be broadened,
its eyes opened, to the more important matter of social re-
lations in society. Such an awareness being unable to
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develop unprodded, however, (because of the influence of
bourgeois ideology and the natural development of only
trade-union consciousness) th.> working class could learn
only from those who possessed knowledge (the vanguard) and
sought to share it through the publication of illegal news-
papers, lectures, study groups, etc. The vanguard bore the
responsibility, then, it was their "bounden duty", to guide
the activities of the working class. The proletariat must
be taken beyond the "narrow" stuggle for merely economic
concessions and shown the reality and corruption of class
domination. within the framework of trade union conscious-
ness, political and economic freedom could never become a
reality; bound by a misunderstanding of social reality, the
proletariat would remain the object of class oppression.
The vanguard, then, would be the stern educators of the
proletariat class
,
taking charge of their class activities
and preventing their subversion by bourgeois ideologists.
If 'we' (the vanguard) desire to be front-rank democrats,
we must make it our concern to direct the thoughts of those
who are dissatisfied only with conditions at the university,
or in the Zemstvo, etc., to the idea that the entire politi-
cal system is worthless
^
This last quotation points to one of the ways in which
the vanguard raises the political consciousness of the people
it demonstrates the class unity of all those groups opposed
to the domination of the monarchy and rule of capital. As
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the socialist revolution was to be a mass revolution, the
vanguard would have to bring together all those groups —
students, laborers, peasants, bourgeois intellectuals --
which would cooperate in making the revolution a reality.
As these groups would otherwise see their opposition to the
government and capitalist society as individual, isolated
struggles, the vanguard demonstrates their common class inter-
est: their identical relationship to the social means of
production. Absorbed in their individual interests, stu-
dents, machine operators, peasants all view their problems
as unique to their particular livelihood and thus fail to
understand the significance of the broad class structure
their position in that structure. Rather than recog-
nizing and joining with their class comrades, segments of
the oppressed class look upon other segments as strangers
bearing no similarity of interest with themselves. Until
the ranks of the opposition to the Tsar were cognizant of,
and organized according to, their full strength, there could
be no hope of a successful revolution, and it was only the
vanguard, by virtue of its political consciousness and
knowledge of class structure, which could offer the proper
guidance to such self-awareness. The party would "unite
into one inseparable whole the assault on the government
6 0in the name of the entire people".
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Another function of the vanguard party was to main-
tain theoretical "purity". Though alliances with other
political groups in the struggle against the monarchy may
be necessary, there could be no compromising the party's
theoretical position. "if you must unite ... then enter
into agreements to satisfy the practical aims of the move
ment, but do not allow any bargaining over principles, do
not make theoretical 'concessions'."^^ Watching the growth
of revisionist, non-revolutionary Marxism go on about him,
"having chosen the path of struggle instead of the path of
conciliation", Lenin felt the need for strong party lead-
ership to prevent true Social-Democracy from slipping into
the "marsh" of opportunist/revisionist/trade unionist
bourgeois politics. Alliances are merely temporary truces
between political parties or factions which share a common
enemy (the Tsar, for example)
. They in no way signify a
coming-to-terms of the parties to the alliance, but merely
a cease-fire between themselves until the greater enemy has
been destroyed. When the goal of the alliance (e.g., to
topple the Tsar) has been fulfilled the alliance can be
unilaterally broken and those who had once been an ally
could then be attacked. In fact, it was what was perceived
by other leftist and Marxist parties in Russia as Lenin's
internecine efforts to splinter the Social Democratic move-
ment which was to them one of the most disturbing aspects
of his politics. To many Social Democrats the most urgent
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task facing the party was not further factionalizing in at-
tempts to establish a more homogeneous party, but a unifica-
tion effort able to consolidate all Social Democrats in a
single body. To Lenin, however, it was of vital importance
to "demarcate" the socialist parties (many of which to him
were socialist in name only) because of their differing levels
of political consciousness and in order for the party with
the most advanced consciousness to be distinguished from the
opportunists and revisionists.^^
Without Social Democratic consciousness, trade-unionism
and wage-slavery would remain the lot of the laboring classes.
Being a scientific consciousness — resting on the findings of
scientific socialism — theoretical unity is absolutely essen-
tial. To achieve such unity, however, it is essential to have
strong, central leadership. Parochial and/or trade interests
being sought independent of the Social Democratic movement
undermine that movement and serve the interests of the bour-
geoisie. Only strong, central leadership could guide the
proletariat through the mists of bourgeois ideology and offer
hope of democracy, freedom and equality.
CHAPTER IV
the vanguard PARTY: ORGANIZATION
To Lenin, the struggle within the party was of the
greatest importance, for within Russian Social Democracy
he saw two incompatible tendencies: a legal Marxism which
would be satisfied with a negotiated settlement with the
Tsar as long as it produced some form of Constitutional
Assembly (that is, the Menshevik faction which saw the
coming revolution as inevitably bourgeois because of the
objective conditions of capitalist development in Russia at
that time as Lenin, too, had once thought, at least as
late as 1905 when he published Two Tactics of Russian Social
Democracy — and were thus aiming for bourgeois democratic
freedoms, which would then be utilized to create the social-
ist revolution) and a true, revolutionary Marxism v^hich rec-
ognized the futility of any hope for a compromise settlement
with the autocracy and which recognized that the dominant
class would never allow itself to be democratically ousted
from power. The path which Russian Social Democracy took
as to party structure would thus determine the probability
of a successful revolution and of a free and equal Russian
society. Thus the intensity with which he approached the
question of party membership.
Many could not understand how Lenin could become so
excited over a proposal he submitted to the 1903 Unification
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Congress of the Social Democratic Party which involved mem-
bership requirements slightly more restrictive than the pro-
posal made by Julius Martov, one of the leading figures of
the soon-to-be created Menshevik faction. Lenin, however,
saw the issue as the decisive one for the party: would it
be a select group capable of offering strong leadership, or
would it be an amorphous mass which would admit any one who
suddenly felt the inclination to be a Social Democrat?
Would the party channel the energies of the revolu-
tionary class in the direction of its historical mission, or
would it timidly - and disasterously- follow at the tail
of the spontaneous workers' movement? The debate over the
competing proposals raged for two full Congress sessions:
Lenin tirelessly campaigning for his position, critics asking
whether or not their comrade was "dreaming of the administra-
tive subordination of the entire party to a few guardians of
doctrine"
; Lenin arguing ceaselessly that central organi-
zation was necessitated by autocratic oppression and in order
to redirect in a social democratic direction the expanding
and competing trade union movement, critics asking whether
or not such central organization would strangle the growing
consciousness of the masses; Lenin arguing that by relin-
quishing its leadership role the party would be surrendering
to opportunist, bourgeois ideologists, critics fearing a
between party and masses which would relegate the
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proletariat to a totally passive role. When the final vote
was at last tallied, Lenin's position had been defeated
twenty-eight votes to twenty-two.
Thus, on the issue he considered most crucial to the
party's success Lenin was in the minority. Minority or not,
however, to Lenin this issue was simply too important to be
decided by vote (at least as long as he remained in the mi-
nority)
. To abandon the vanguard structure, to abandon this
leadership organization, would be to abandon social democ-
racy, and this certainly was unthinkable. There could be no
denying, said Lenin, the fact that the spontaneous workers'
movement inevitably opted for trade unionism, not social de-
mocracy. There could be no denying that a workers' movement
independent of conscious, revolutionary leadership would in-
evitably be corrupted by negotiation with the autocracy and’
the liberal bourgeoisie. Under no circumstances could the
theory of the vanguard party be rejected and abandoned --
those who did reject it were obviously under the influence
of opportunists and bourgeois ideologists. (It is ironic
that a Unification Congress such as this should make more
clear and unbridgeable the ideas dividing the two factions.)
A part of the gulf separating Lenin from the Mensheviks
was a result of the slightly different ways in which they
interpreted the Marxist view of history. Remaining more
true to Marx's original forecast as to the course of capi-
talist development and the birth of socialism -- that a
I
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b2HE2£oii revolution establishing the capitalist class as
predominant (a stage not yet experienced in Russia) was
necessary to create those conditions (an enormous, liter-
ate, politically class conscious proletariat) necessary for
the socialist revolution — the Mensheviks were more patient
with the working class and were confident in their ability,
under the necessary objective conditions, to spontaneously
develop class consciousness. Lenin, however, having a
greater fear of the power of bourgeois ideology and witness-
ing the growth of social phenomena which affected the course
of capitalist development (imperialism, trade unions) and
socialism (international socialism), had much less faith in
spontaneity. The socialist revolution was inevitable, but
only because class conscious fighters took charge of the
historical moment. Bearing the knowledge of dialectics, the
vanguard takes control of the immediate and shapes it as
history had ordained. Lenin, much more so than the Menshe-
viks, was convinced of the importance of the individual in
molding the shape of his world.
The second type of leadership rendered by the vanguard
(in addition to theoretical) was organizational leadership.
Sensitive to remarks by critics which charged that Lenin,
through central organization, sought to create a party dom-
inated by a ruling elite, he responded by assuring his com-
rades that he was not a Blanquist conspirator and that con-
spirators were bound to fail without popular support, but
that this did not free the party of a need for "strong rev-
olutionary organisation". A loosely organized, spontaneous
mass movement, he argued, was destined to fail because it
would have no stability and endurance, and it would be over-
whelmed by the organized forces of the autocracy opposing it.
A revolutionary movement was not only political, it was also
military. Earlier we spoke of Lenin's penchant for the mil-
itary metaphor and we now see from where such an inclination
arose. He approached revolutionary activity with the utmost
seriousness and with few illusions: the pending revolution
would be one of the great moments in world history, many would
die, and without proper use of their resources, the prole-
tarian victory may be indefinitely delayed. He wrote with
a measure of scorn of those revolutionary groups in pre-
Bolshevik times which approached revolution without proper
theoretical and organizational leadership:
These new warriors marched to battle with aston-ishingly primitive equipment and training. in a
vast number of cases they had almost no equipment
and absolutely no training. They marched to warlike peasants from the plough, armed only with
clubs. A students' circle establishes contacts
with workers and sets to work, without any con-
nection with study circles in other districts, or
even in parts of the same city,
. . . without any
organisation of the various divisions of revolu-
tionary work, without any systematic plan of
activity covering any length of time.^^
Facing the strength of a modern centralized state with
its military might, any revolutionary movement which hopes
for success must have the guidance of a general staff.
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The vanguard would supply the direction as to how to strike,
when to strike, and where to strike. The opposition forces
could not possibly crush autocratic oppression without a
well-organized and well-trained army. Divided into various
factions the Social Democratic movement possessed nowhere
near the strength it could flex if united into a common front
(provided, of course, that the party was led by the class
conscious Bolsheviks). To maintain such unity, however,
requires the direction of a ctmtral authority. The party
leadership -- bearing the truths of scientific socialism,
having political consciousness, having profited from the
study of the science of dialectics — was the natural choice
to be the organ of this direction.
In What Is to Be Done ?
,
Lenin speaks of five rules
for revolutionary organization: 1.) no movement can sur-
vive without an organization of leaders which give it sta-
bility and endurance; 2.) as the party's membership in-
creases organization becomes of greater importance, for the
less conscious members of the party will then find it more
difficult to "side-track" the direction of the party; 3.)
good organization requires full-time and professional (not
part-time and amateur) leadership; 4.) in a politically op-
pressive environment such as Russia, professional, restrict-
ed membership is necessary to ensure that the party is not
penetrated and subverted by the secret police; and 5.) an
organized party will be better able to utilize a greater
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number of members in its activities . ^6 As is clear, Lenin's
concern for organisation reflects an equal concern for ef-
ficiency - only through proper organisation could the party
realize its full strength. As monopoly capital was a higher
stage of development than competitive capitalism because it
had done away with the social inefficiencies of the compet-
itive market (e.g., the larger scale of its production per-
mitted greater productivity; there was less "wasted" effort
in having fewer producers distributing basically the same
product) — though it was no less destined to self-destruction
than any earlier stage of capitalism — the highly organized,
professional revolutionary party v;as a more efficient and
effective organ of the proletarian revolutionary movement
than the spontaneous, mass-led parties.
Again, Lenin could not accept the possibility of rev-
olutionary activity being spontaneous and undirected. If a
situation could be controlled — through the mediation of a
political party, for example — it should be controlled and
directed according to the laws of the science of dialectics.
In fact, however, both the revolutions of 1905 and 1917
erupted spontaneously and to the surprise of party leaders.
Lenin himself, after the experience of 1905, felt that the
next revolutionary outbreak would also be unexpected, but
that the party must be prepared to immediately take control.
Thus, although the party did not have such control as to be
able to start the revolution itself, when a period of
insurrection did arise the masses would need the organizing
abilities of the party to structure and direct revolutionary
activities. Revolution was not, to Lenin, primarily an
emotional outburst, but rather a rational, willful, (though
violent) means of social transformation. Thus it was both
important and possible for it to be consciously and ration-
ally executed.
Lenin was caught in a difficult dilemma: how was he
to balance the party's need for centralization with its ne-
cessity of being a popular, mass party? Though the most com-
mon criticism of Lenin charges him with being an "ultra-
centrist
,
he himself was convinced that only the proletariat
could create the revolution:
The intellectuals nicely decide problems "in
principle", they nicely draw the blueprint,
nicely debate on the necessity of action . .
.
k>ut the workers do act, and do transform gray
theory into living life. 57
The vanguard was the agent of consciousness, but the pro-
letariat was the agent of revolution.
Rejecting the accusation that he was a "Blanquist",
Lenin claimed that Blanqui had not understood the realities
of class conflict in history and in capitalist society, and
that his revolutionary attempts had thus been easily crushed.
Lenin, on the other hand, having the advantage of scientific
socialism, recognized the conditions of the successful rev-
olution: first, it must "rely not upon conspiracy ... but
upon the advanced class"; secondly, it must "rely upon a
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revolutionary upsurge of the oponi.-
. und third, it must
'rely upon the tuning-point in the history of the growing
revolution when the activity of the advanced ranks of the
people IS at its height, and when the vacillations in the
ranks of the enemy and in the ranks of the weak, half-
hearted and irresolute friends of the revolution are
^tronge^. Blanqui had made the error of thinking that
the combined power of the autocracy and capitalist class
could be overthrown without the active support of the masses
Being a Marxist, however, Lenin held that freedom and equal-
ity could come only through class battle and the dictator-
ship of the proletariat class
,
not minority vanguard acting
for that class.
At the same time, however, the vanguard was the leader
of the Social Democratic Party. Though it is necessary to
be responsive to the wishes of the masses, lacking the po-
litical consciousness of the vanguard they could easily
lead the party astray. in his speach "On the Deception of
the People with Slogans of Freedom and Equality", he criti-
cized those who called on the Bolsheviks to fulfill the po-
litical promises with which they rose in power, in 1917
,
for those promises appealed not to the true consciousness
of the workers' movement but only to spontaneous political
opinion, thus the Bolsheviks were not obligated to honor
them.
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Popular support was an integral component of any Marx-
political party, though at times in Lenin's variation it
was difficult to determine whether mass support was instru-
mental because it signified the coming-to-consciousness of
the proletariat or simply because it so expanded the troops
of the Bolsheviks. it was important to be at least somewhat
receptive to the masses to ensure their political allegiance,
but did not the vanguard alone possess political conscious-
ness, along with the theoretical and organizational leader-
ship required for a revolutionary movement? If the party
was to survive politically it must undoubtedly be sympathet-
ic to the demand of the people, but could it allow the
working-class movement to follow its natural, spontaneous
path to trade union consciousness? Could the leadership
sacrifice its conscious political knowledge in order to main-
tain its mass support? Could the leadership submit to the
spontaneous demands of the proletariat though it may run
counter to a conscious party position? Lenin felt it le-
gitimate to bow to spontaneity only if it was absolutely
essential in maintaining popular support. For this reason
he felt a greater need for central organization and discipline
than did the Mensheviks, who were more receptive to the spon-
taneous demands of the proletariat.
Lenin justified strong, centrally directed organization
on the grounds that it was necessary to educate the masses in
social democratic consciousness. There are, however, different
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ways to approach education. is the student to remain in
complete submission to the professor because of the latter's
greater knowledge, or is he to take an active role in his
own education and maintain a degree of independence in his
studies, while acknowledging his debt to his teacher? Lenin
believed in that type of education in which the educator
reigns supreme. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, were
willing to give their charges greater independence. As Rosa
Luxemburg (the Polish Social-Democrat who, on questions other
than organizational, usually sided with Lenin) said, "the
working class demands the right to make its mistakes and
learn in the dialectic of history ... Historically, the
errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are in-
finitely more fruitful than the infallibility of the clever-
est Central Committee"
. Lenin feared that such "mistakes"
could prove fatal to the social democratic movement.
The stern disciplinary education Lenin sought to give
the proletariat may prove beneficial in the short run, some
critics claimed, but they viewed such "learning" more in
terms of manipulation than education. Though Lenin certainly
would never admit such a charge, that organization afforded
a certain degree of control over the usually unwieldy masses
was undoubtedly a factor in his highly valuing it.
Spontaneity may not be eradicable, but it could be
channeled in directions determined by the vanguard. As was
noted above, spontaneous political demands may be exploited
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for the benefit of the movement, but they need not actually
be fulfilled. The vanguard must necessarily be responsive
and responsible to those segments of the working class which
have attained Social Democratic consciousness (in fact, those
segments of the proletariat no longer have a need for the
vanguard — who held their position because of their superior
knowledge - except for organizational advice such as when,
where, and how to strike at the Tsar), but they are not
bound in a similar relationship to non-conscious elements of
the proletariat. Though theoretically the vanguard is always
to serve only as educator to the proletariat, Lenin's above
remark — that the Bolsheviks need not fulfill promises made
to the nonconscious masses — indicates that it may not be
entirely inappropriate to deceive the (unconscious) masses
serves the proletarian cause. As Meyer writes, to
Lenin social forces are there to be used by the conscious
history-maker. Spontaneity is something that can be manip-
ulated. Hence his insistence on organization, discipline,
central direction, and leadership"
.
Just what was involved in this central organization?
How thorough need centralization be? Though organization was
necessitated in order to provide for the proper (i.e., social
democratic) education of the vrarkers, that it also be highly
centralized was necessitated by the fact that the Social
Democratic Party was operating in a hostile environment —
Tsarist Russia. In battle with the defenders of the autocracy.
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a revolutionary party needed secrecy if it was to survive,
and secrecy requires centralization. He rejected calls for
democratic organization because, he wrote, '"broad democracy'
in Party organisation amidst the gloom of the autocracy and
the domination of the gendarmerie, is nothing more than a
useless and harmful toy ".^^ Democracy presumed freedom of
publicity and free and open election, neither of which could
be expected in Imperial Russia. To demand a "democratic"
organization under such conditions would thus work to the
advantage of the bourgeoisie. What was demanded of the move-
ment now was the strictest discipline in order to allow the
growth of the revolutionary party in such a repressive set-
ting.
The party is in a position in which the strictest
centralism and the most stringent discipline are
absolute necessities. All decisions of the higher
headquarters are absolutely binding for the lower.
Every decision must first of all be executed, and
only after that an appeal to the corresponding
party organ is permissible. In this sense, outright
military discipline is indispensable in the party
at the present time.^2
The party was vulnerable from two directions: from
inside (from those social democratic factions which bowed
to spontaneity and endorsed only the weakest of party organ-
ization) and from outside (from the forces of the Tsar and
liberal bourgeois who sought either to destroy the movement
or so weaken it that it became acceptable to the capitalist
class). Standing against both foes was the centralized
party, which maintained a truly social democratic revolu-
tionary position.
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Even were Lenin politically active in the most enlight-
ened democratic bourgeois republic, however, though the party
be less secretive (open elections and campaigning would
be possible)
,
it is not the case that it would necessarily
be less centralized. The party still being responsible for
the political, theoretical, and organizational leadership of
the masses, it would seem that the hierarchy of knowledge
within the party would correspond to a "natural" hierarchy
of office: those most fully possessing proletarian, social
democratic consciousness (a determination made not by elec-
tion but by judgement of one already conscious, i.e.
, through
selection) would naturally hold the most important offices
and bear the greatest authority. Thus, although Lenin jus-
tified secrecy and centralization with the oppressive Rus-
sian political environment, any mass political party — such
as the Bolshevik whose leadership claims its position on
account of superior knowledge will necessarily have a non-
democratic form of party organization.
To Lenin, the choice between strong organization and a
more democratic structure which granted the lower strata of
the party more autonomy was a choice between conscious dis-
cipline and a destructive anarchy. It was only bourgeois
intellectuals, not individual proletarians, who demanded the
"right" to an independence which obstructs the necessary
ideological unity of the Social Democratic Party. The life-
style of the proletariat (centering around the factory system
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Which teaches the value of organization) better prepares them
for the order and discipline demanded of them by the party
than does the undisciplined life of the intellectual. Fur-
thermore, the proletariat does not have the same distrustful
attitude towards organization as do the intellectuals; they
recognize the efficiency it offers and the strength of unified
action. It was either the "consistent application of the
principle of organisation, or the sanctification of disunity
and anarchy"
.
^ The debate between Bolshevik and Menshevik
theories of party structure was a debate between "autonomism
and centralism, between democracy, and 'bureaucracy', be-
tween the tendency to relax and the tendency to tighten or-
ganisation and discipline, between the mentality of the un-
stable intellectual and that of the staunch proletarian, be-
tween intellectualist individualism and proletarian soli-
darity"
. The Mensheviks were concerned that too struc-
tured a party would prevent it from ever developing a mass
base; Lenin would have nothing to do with any potential
party member who rejected its discipline or refused the re-
quired amount of active party work, for these reflected on
the applicant's level of committment. Control over the
party was absolutely essential, for.
Disunited by the rule of anarchic competition
in the bourgeois world, ground down by forced
labor for capital, constantly thrust back to
the "lower depths" of utter destitution, sav-
agery, and degeneration, the proletariat can,
and inevitably will, become an invincible force
only through its ideological unification on the
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principles of Marxism being reinforced by the
unity of organisation, which wields
millions of toilers into an army of the work-ing class. 65
Consciousness and proletarian victory were thus no longer
inevitable without the influence of the "material unity of
organisation"
.
A "democratic" revolutionary party left its members
outside the authority of the party and this was clearly un-
acceptable to Lenin. At the 1903 Unification Congress the
respective proposals of Lenin and Martov concerning require-
ments for party membership were: (Lenin) "A member of the
Party is one who accepts its programme and who supports the
Party both financially and by personal participation in one
of the Party organisations"; (Martov) "A member of the Russian
Social—Democratic Labour Party is one who accepts its pro-
gramme, supports the Party financially, and renders it reg-
ular personal assistance under the direction of one of its
organisations". Though the differences between these two
drafts may appear to be minimal, Lenin's proposal, requiring
"personal participation in one of the Party organisations,"
demands a greater committment from potential party members.
Involvement in the party must be active and consistent, not
primarily passive and dependent on how much free time the
individual has to devote to revolutionary activity. More-
over, active participation in party activities is necessary
if the party hopes to maintain that measure of control over
its members which is so necessary for the vanguard party:
83
"can the o a^ns of tlie_Par^ exercise actual direction over
Party members who do not belong to any of the Party orga-
nisations? "
As equally Important a reason for central organization
as the need for secrecy and the need for a unified political
consciousness was that organization made for better decisions
One important condition in making good decisions is that the
most knowledgeable people — in a political party, the most
conscious members — bear the most responsibility. Thus,
in Lenin's party it was not of greatest importance that a
decision be reached democratically, but that the people with
the requisite knowledge (i.e., the vanguard) are those mak-
ing the final choices. To demand that the entire party
take part in this process would be self-defeating, for that
would involve even the least conscious segments of the party
in the decision-making process. In his book One Step Forward
,
—
Steps Back
,
he writes clearly of the gap separating the
vanguard from the masses, a gap which should be mirrored in
the party structure: "... precisely because there are dif-
ferences in degree of consciousness and degree of activity,
a distinction must be made in degree of proximity to the
6 7party" ; "to forget the distinction between the vanguard
and the whole of the masses gravitating towards it, to for-
get the vanguard's essential duty of raising ever wider
sections to its own advanced level, means simply to deceive
oneself ..." (This book
,
however, was written in 1904 as
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a long commentary on the 1903 Unification Congress. More
than any other of his works it reflects a faith in centralized
organization, but with time the "hardness" of organization
pictured here softened slightly.)
As was was noted earlier, the method employed by Lenin
in "raising" this level of consciousness was not one which
allowed a semi-autonomous proletariat to teach itself, to
learn from its mistakes, but one in which the masses were
strictly schooled in the social democratic ideology by pas-
sively accepting the guidance of the vanguard. To have any
but the most conscious individuals direct the party would
both prevent the raising of proletarian consciousness be-
cause the party would continue to be plagued by the cancer
of opportunist thought and would prevent the party from
achieving its full strength by introducing dissension into
what should be a united front. As he wrote in One Step For-
ward. Two Steps Back
,
the party must be able to "work out
organisational relations that will ensure a definite level
of consciousness and systematically raise this level".
Those relations are the relations of democratic centralism.
At the same time as there was secret, central direction,
the party was to remain politically open, as befit a popular
movement: "Centralisation of the secret functions of the
organisation by no means implies centralisation of all the
functions of the movement" . ^ ^ That the party organization
was to effectively dominate that movement was downplayed.
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Though Lenin perceived an ideological gulf between vanguard
and masses, and although that gulf was to be incorporated
into the organizational structure of the party, he did be-
lieve that the masses had an important role to play in the
party, though by Western standards that role may be viewed
as unacceptably restricted. Lenin was not so much an au-
thoritarian dictator as he was a man with a mania for or-
ganization. Still, that emphasis on organization was itself
partly an outgrowth of his less than total faith in the
ability of the masses to correctly utilize the freedoms of
political democracy, and the party structure was to counter
this unreliability of the proletariat.
What was most important for the party was to be able
to make correct decisions in a democratic manner, without
allowing individuals to abuse the freedom of discussion and
delay action with specious argumentation. On the contrary,
united in their social democratic viewpoint, party members
should be able to quickly arrive at decisions demanding res-
olution. Lenin developed the principle of democratic cen-
to supply the proper balance of democracy, efficiency
and discipline to the decision-making process.
Initially one may suspect that democratic and central-
ized organizations are incompatible. Does not the democratic
require that individuals bound by a decision have
a voice in its discussion and settlement? If a member is not
a direct party to such a discussion, is not his representative
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to that discussion responsible (to him) for his actions?
Does not an individual retain the right to declare his op-
position to any decision arrived at by the group, to main-
tain that oposition, and to attempt to convince others of
the folly of any particular choice? Does not the principle
of centralism, on the other hand, bind the individual to
decisions completed without this (direct or indirect) in-
volvement? Are not the individuals making choices in a
central committee free of any political responsibility to
those affected by it? Are not those bound to a decision of
a central organ bound without appeal? How, then, did Lenin
combine these two organizational forms while preserving the
essence of each?
Basically, the system Lenin created was a hierarchy of
party organs each subject to its superior which was labeled
democratic because each higher body was to be elected by its
subordinate
.
The main principle of democratic centralism is
that of the higher cell being elected by the
lower cell, the absolute binding force of all
directives of a higher cell for a cell subord-
inate to it, and the existence of a commanding
party center (whose authority is) undisputable
for all leaders in party life, from one con-
gress to the next. /I
In practice, democratic elections were a rarity, Lenin pre-
ferring the co-optation of selected members (such as Stalin)
to the party committees rather than having to be dependent
on the electoral system. Thus the party was assured of
having the proper individual in the proper position.
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That there was "absolute binding force of all directives
of a higher cell for a cell subordinate to it" was necessary
two reasons. to preserve the unified nature of the party
and because the decisions made were "scientific" in nature.
Of the first of these reasons we have spoken previously; of
the second — the scientific character of Marxist social
democracy we have only made scattered references.
Marx and Engels viewed their work as social science,
emphasizing the latter (science). Writing in the mid- to
late-nineteenth centruy when faith in man's capacity for
knowledge led many to believe that the perfectly balanced
and ordered society was finally becoming possible, Marx and
Engels studied and worked towards an ideal of social science
which matched the precision of the natural sciences. This
tendency was especially marked in Engels. Lenin, too, had
such a view of Marxist studies and scientific socialism:
its findings bore the status of scientific findings. Thus,
if anyone claimed to be a true social democrat, he would
naturally be receptive to the official party program. Lenin
did not claim that the party could not make mistakes, he did
not claim that the party was infallible; in fact he readily
admitted that the party could, and did, err. Self-criticism
was an important duty of the party. Still, the social dem-
ocratic understanding of society and class relations was a
scientific one which bred, and demanded, theoretical and
"practical" unity.
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The first chapter of Wic\t Is to Be Done?
, for example,
IS devoted to a discussion of "Dogmatism and 'Freedom of
Criticism"'. Lenin argues here that, as social democratic
Ideology is founded on a "scientific" basis, and as "those
who are really convinced that they have made progess in
science would not demand freedom for the new views to con-
tinue side by side with the old, but the substitution of
the new views for the old",^^ freedom of criticism
cannot be allowed within the party, it being yet another ex-
ample of opportunist social thought. Bearing the scientific
truths of social theory, the vanguard alone possessed the
necessary knowledge for political decisions and, being cor-
rect, the party should be bound by them. The vanguard did
not seek to monopolize that knowledge, in fact just the con-
trary was true; it sought to make ever larger portions of
the masses politically conscious. Yet, ironically, this
would only reinforce centralism, as the more conscious the
masses became the more they would come to see the wisdom of
the policies and strategies of the vanguard and the more
readily they would voluntarity submit to their decisions
and the hierarchy of political cells. In fact, from reading
a work such as One Step Forward, Two Steps Back one gains
the impression that Lenin measured the degree of political
consciousness of the masses by their willingness and readi-
ness to accept the party organization and program. (It must
be noted, however, that Lenin's diatribe against "freedom of
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criticism" was meant only for his opponent's ears. When the
Bolshevik faction was not in the majority in the Social Dem-
ocratic Party, Lenin was a fervent and vociferous critic of
his opponents, whether such action was ''opportunist'' or not.)
The self-criticism which was permissible would be that of the
vanguard leadership. Only those with a fuller knowledge of
scientific socialism could criticize a current party position
It was only rarely, however, that individuals in that group
would challenge their own privileged positions. (It was,
for example, years after Stalin's death before anyone would
challenge his sanctity. When that challenge finally did
arise, it was thrown by the Premier of the Soviet state,
Khruschev.
)
Lenin was an active man. it is not surprising that
his most famous work is entitled What Is to Be Done ? This
"urgency" in his character at times led to an impatience on
his part with intellectuals -- their independence frustrated
attempts to unify the party and their concern for abstract
argumentation Lenin considered petty and unproductive in
terms of practical activity. It was not that he disapproved
of debate and discussion — he was himself a tireless speaker
and campaigner. He felt, however, that the centralism of
his party was necessary to ensure that important decisions
would not be held up by needless rhetoric. Party decisions
would not be made without debate, but that debate must be
prevented from becoming irresponsible. "Without debates.
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conflicts, without a war between opinions, no movement,
including the workers' movement, is possible at all. But
without a merciless fight against the degeneration of con-
flicts into quarrels and squabbles, ^ organisation is im-
possible. That it was left to a central committee to
make the distinction between a legitimate conflict and an
irresponsible squabble was much less troubling to Lenin
than it was to his opponents.
That centralism could be democratic was possible
because of the high degree of "volunatry centralism" of
the socialist community. Having noted the "scientific"
character of Marxian socialism, this led Lenin to a mechan-
istic view of politics. Assuming that everyone would not
act politically from the same ideological viewpoint (all
would now share an identical class interest as all would
share the same relationship to the social means of produc-
tion)
,
political conflict would be transcended and "politics"
would merely be a matter of administration. All sharing the
identical class interest, all would be in basic agreement
as to social goals. The "state" (which actually is no long-
er a "state", as a state is the creation of class conflict,
which no longer exists -- there is no class oppression, there
can no longer be a state) will become the "administration of
things, not government over persons"”^ ; "people will grow
accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social
existence without force and without subjection"
.
Being
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united in interest, citizens will spontaneously be unified
as to the ends of society and will voluntarily concur with
the leadership of the party's central organs. Lenin devel-
oped this vision of the socialist cominunity in a book written
in the summer preceding the Octiober, 1917 takeover by the
Bolsheviks, State and Revolution. It was his most uncharac-
teristic work, dealing not with immediate political realities
but with what many rightly consider an impractical socialist
Utopia.
All conflict of interest having disappeared, the Com-
munist Party is not an instrument of force, but the executive
of a nearly unanimous general will. This is the rationale
behind the one party system in the Soviet Union: there being
only a single class, a single social interest, there can be
only one political party to represent it. One should also
thus not be surprised in reading that Communist officials
elected in the USSR garner upwards of 90% of the vote: any
election netting a successful candidate only 40 to 60% of the
vote (as is most often the case here in the United States)
would admit of a serious division in the electorate, a divi-
sion Soviet officials would have difficulty justifying in
theoretical terms.
Social Democratic political consciousness, then, be-
cause of its scientific foundation and ideological unity
naturally favors centralized organization and administration,
a centralization which is not, however, (in Lenin's view)
undemocratic
.
chapter V
THE VANGUARD PARTY: CRITICISMS FROM SOCIAL DEMOCRATS
Lenin's theory of the party, however, had many critics,
perhaps the most famous of whom was Rosa Luxemburg. A leader
of the German Social Democratic Party, Luxemburg was keenly
interested in the progress of Russian Social Democracy as
her homeland, Poland, was at that time under the control of
the Russian autocracy. she was, like Lenin, committed to the
Idea of social revolution and generally agreed more with his
analyses of the political situation and the goals of a rev-
olutionary party than with the proposals of the Mensheviks,
but in matters of organization she was the most eloquent and
persuasive critic of Lenin's organizational theories from a
Menshevik" point of view. Her major work on party structure
was published in 1904, two years after Lenin published What
—to Be Done ?, (partly as a response to that work) and was
entitled "Organizational Questions of the Russian Social
Democracy"
.
The task of Russian Social Democracy, as Luxemburg saw
it, was unique in history: to create a politically conscious
working class in a nation which lacked that social class which
is usually the catalyst of proletarian consciousness — a
dominant bourgeoisie. In Western Europe it had been the op-
pression, both political and economic, of the capitalist class
which was the most important factor in the growth of prole-
tarian consciousness. In Russia, on the other hand, though
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capitalism was an ever-greater influence, social democracy
also had to overturn the autocracy. Thus, although Marx's
analysis of capitalist society was applicable to Russia, as
the early Russian Marxists had demonstrated, the primary
source of class oppression remained the autocracy, not the
bourgeoisie. It was the task of a social democratic party,
then, to lead the working class to political consciousness
despite these unfavorable conditions. Thus her vision of
the rol^ of the Marxist party was fundamentally the same as
Lenin s, that is, it was to lead the masses to a level of
awareness making revolution possible. Her differences with
Lenin arose over the structure of that party.
Luxemburg admitted that social democratic political
parties have a tendency towards centralization, and for the
same reason as did Lenin: their goal is a unified, national
party bringing together all workers irrespective of local,
trade, or religious differences. She rejected Lenin's cen-
tral organization, however, because she considered it ex-
cessive (she called him an "ultracentralist" and a "pitiless
centralist") and felt that it worked against the ultimate
goal of the party: mass political consciousness.
A social democratic party, being a mass, popular move-
ment, serves primarily as an instrument of education, and
party structure must reflect this emphasis. Unlike Lenin,
Luxemburg did not view education as a passive process. Though
she would admit that some possess greater social consciousness
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than others, there could be no structural distinction between
them for then the process would change from education to man-
ipulation. This was her charge against Lenin: by advocating
a structural separation of the vanguard from the masses and
demanding "blind subordination" of the latter to the vanguard,
Lenin had created a party in which a central committee is the
"only thinking element", and the masses had been reduced to
acting merely as its "executive limbs". she thought the
efforts of the vanguard to educate the masses through lectures,
newspapers, journals, etc. to be legitimate and beneficial,
but that the vanguard must recognize that its role is limited
to education, that the masses cannot be made conscious by
judicious use of organization, but only by their own revolu-
;
^onary activity
. Lenin, she thought, sought to deny the mas-
ses, through excessive organization and discipline, that
liberty of action which alone will permit them to develop
their revolutionary initiative and to utilize all the re-
sources of the situation"
. Lenin, she said, was "full of
the sterile spirit of the overseer" who, through control over
the party and actions of the masses, restricts and narrows
the workers consciousness, a consciousness which would be
more full and profound if it gave the proletariat the free-
dom to explore social relations on its own. Excessive party
discipline would only stifle and cripple whatever potential
for independent thought and action possessed by the working
class. Does one seek a class educated by rote, or a class
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with enough self-sufficiency and energy to play the decisive
role in the coming socialist revolution and society?
The social democratic movement requires "coordination
and unification", but not "rigid submission" to a vanguard,
regardless of its th€:oretical superiority. Rather than being
opportunist to forsake strong organization, Luxemburg saw
true opportunism as attempting to make use of a politically
immature proletarian movement by structuring it so that it
more closely resembles a military unit than an autonomous.
Politically conscious class party. Contrary to Lenin, Lux-
emburg held that a truly social democratic party could never
be structured from the top downward; in fact just the oppo-
site. True proletarian consciousness could not simply be
imparted from one individual to another, it had to be earned.
Political consciousness spontaneously arises out of the class
conflict within society (a conflict not sufficiently developed
in Russia) ; it cannot be guaranteed by membership in a par-
ticular organizational body.
Lenin felt that because of the influences of bourgeois
ideology, trade unionism, etc. the proletariat could not gain
consciousness without the strong leadership and guidance of
the vanguard; Luxemburg feared that such guidance would limit
the proletariat's ability to think freely and openly about
social issues, and without free thought how could one possibly
speak of consciousness? Lenin felt that thought could not be
free and open as long as class domination and oppression
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existed, and that it was thus the goal of the revolution to
open free political discourse for the first time. He never
denied in his writings that the primary role of the vanguard
was educative, making possible a conscious, mass uprising.
Yet in practice he advocated the seizure of power while the
Bolsheviks were still a minority party and when the prole-
tariat admittedly had not yet reached either majority status
in the population or social democratic consciousness.
A large part of the differences in organizational
theory between Lenin and Luxemburg can be traced to their
respective degrees of confidence in the proletariat. Luxem-
burg, as befits a democrat, had faith in the intelligence
and energy of the working class, remaining firm in her con-
viction that the proletariat itself would come to recognize
their class solidarity and interest. After all, if the mass-
es are not intelligent and perceptive enough to known what
best serves them, why should one favor democracy? Perhaps an
aristocracy of the conscious" would then better serve the
interests of a "socialist" society.
Lenin, while not lacking any faith whatsoever in the
proletariat, did feel that the combination of bourgeois ide-
ology and trade union consciousness created conditions crip-
pling to social democratic consciousness. Whereas Luxemburg
praised spontaneity as bringing about "the most important
and most fruitful changes" in social democratic tactics,
Lenin always feared that spontaneity favored the liberal
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bourgeois parties. Though he would never put it quite so
boldly, he distrusted the masses as long as they remained
outside the influence of the vanguard, without the vanguard,
the masses would continue to agitate for solely economic
gains, continuing to live amidst political oppression. m
effect, without the vanguard, the proletariat could never
create the revolution.
Luxemburg never thought in this way. To her, such a
statement would be inconceivable, for it would be to forsake
all confidence in that class which is to create the socialist
society. Surely the party would offer guidance and organi-
zation, but never to the point where the masses have lost a
voice in the direction of the party. if one is a democrat,
one can never abandon democratic principles, regardless of
how unfavorable conditions may be. In 1918, in her appraisal
of Bolshevik Russia, she wrote:
Without general elections, without unrestricted
freedom of press and assembly, without a free
struggle of opinion, life dies out in every pub-
lic institution, becomes a mere semblance of life,
in which only the bureaucracy remains as the ac-
tive element. Public life gradually falls asleep,
a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy
and boundless experience direct and rule. Among
them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do
the leading and an elite of the working class is
invited from time to time to meetings where they
are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to
approve proposed resolutions unanimously ... a dic-
tatorship, to be sure, not the dictatorship of the
proletariat, however, but only the dictatorship of
a handful of politicians, that is a dictatorship in
the bourgeois sense ... Yes, we can go even further:
such conditions must inevitably cause a brutaliza-
tion of public life: attempted assassinations,
shooting of hostages, etc. 79
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It IS painful to think how prophetic these words have
proven, but Rosa Luxemburg saw this future as an inevitable
one if one adopted the elitist structure of Lenin's central-
ist vanguard party. Lenin, of course, envisioned a society
radically different from this. The vanguard was absolutely
essential to consciousness and revolutionary success, but it
would be the masses, albeit under the guidance of the van-
guard, who would establish socialism.
Another Social-Democratic critic of Lenin was the Men-
shevik leader Paul Axelrod. One of the founders of Russian
Marxism, Axelrod was also one of Lenin's most vocal critics.
Originally concerned with the defects of the Bolshevik party
structure, Axelrod eventually came to discern not only or-
ganizational distinctions between the Bolshevik and Menshevik
factions, but also "moral and psychological ones".^^
The fundamental criticism made by Axelrod of Lenin
was that the latter collapsed the distinction between the
party and its organization, that is, one could not speak of
the worker's party without reference to its organizational
leadership. Though Axelrod did not deny the value of, or
need for, party leadership, his emphasis was on mass par-
ticipation
,
not on the necessity of the masses to follow the
directives of the party's central organizations. As Axelrod
saw it, a Social-Democratic party must encourage the partic-
ipation and leadership of its members, not their passive sub-
ordination to the party hierarchy. To Axelrod the party
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consisted of its membership, not its leadership. m failing
to note that distinciiion Lenin was transforming a popular,
class party into a submissive body which did not deserve
the label of political party. The masses were subordinated
to the leadership rather than taking a hand itself in the
direction of its own political destiny. m making the party
and It organization synonymous, Lenin had sacrificed its
popular basis and created a party which was most un-democratic
and un-representative.
A second criticism leveled by Axelrod at Lenin con-
cerned the educative function of the party. As has been
noted, Lenin held that social democratic consciousness could
not arise spontaneously and would have to be introduced by
the vanguard party. Axelrod, however, vigorously objected
to such a view. if workers could not develop social dem-
ocratic consciousness themselves, he said, one should aban-
don any hope in socialism, for working class subordination to
a central hierarchy would not only fail to hasten that con-
sciousness, but would most likely make it impossible
. Only
through their own efforts would the workers be able to obtain
socialist consciousness, and Bolshevism greatly restricted
the political independence which the proletariat needed to
emancipate itself. One can clearly see the similarity of
Axelrod's critique with that of Luxemburg.
Where Lenin was most concerned with the ability of the
party to maintain its strength and cohesiveness in a repres-
sive political environment, Axelrod was most concerned with
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the way in which the party grew: through democratic decision-
making and popular participation. To a degree, Lenin's party
structure must be seen in response to the political situation
in Russia: Lenin was a revolutionary in an autocratic society
At the same time, no substantial revisions were advocated by
Lenin in party organization after the revolution had been
consolidated.
Throughout his writings on organizational matters,
Lenin consistently referred to Tsarist oppression as a factor
in shaping the structure of his party. Many, however, find
such reasoning insufficient. One such writer is the Yugoslav
Communist Milovan Djilas, who writes:
If the end must be used to condone the means,
then there is something in the end itself, in
its reality which is not worthy. That which
really blesses the end, which justifies the
efforts and sacrifices for it, is the means:
their constant perfection, humaneness, in-
creasing freedom.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
Lenin's politics is the politics of organization.
Sheldon Wolin pictures him as further developing a line of
thought molded by capitalists, but extending its application
from the economic to the political: "If organization could
conquer nature for the capitalist, it could surely conquer
society for the proletariat".^^ The question for politics
now became not how much organization could democracy endure,
but rather how much democracy could organization endure?^"^
The organized Party makes successful revolution possible,
and politics in the socialist society becomes simply a mat-
ter of proper administration. The multi-party political
system has become outmoded -- it is simply too inefficient.
"Conventional" politics was the product of class struggle
and conflict: peasant vs. landowner, laborer vs. capitalist,
rural vs. urban. The socialist society, however, precluded
any such conflict. Although disputes would conceivably still
arise, they would be democratically settled within the party,
as no question could be allowed to sunder the united front of
the party in its relation to society. There is no place for
a "loyal opposition": it is both practically and theoretically
at odds with the Leninist theory of the state.
The organized Party was the more rational and more dis-
ciplined body. Its decisions and actions were never marred by
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inconsistency, inaccuracy, or half-heartedness of effort
All members share a common goal and willingly sacrifice
their individual interest to the public. Party-approved
approach toward that end. with the guidance of the con-
scious party leadership, united with the support of the
masses, social energies will no longer be wasted in the
struggle between divergent class interests.
Lenin had originally approached organization as a
means to buttress the inconstant proletarian movement. He
did not share with Marx or Luxemburg a great faith in the
ability of the proletariat to naturally develop a revolu-
tionary political consciousness. Thus, the responsibility
for the creation of that consciousness fell to the vanguard.
Yet organization gradually became more than just a means to
an end — its efficiency and rationality were not easily
discarded. Once having adopted Lenin's social democratic
viewpoint, politics was no longer a matter of interests
(public and/vs. private), ethics, discussion, tradition, and
power, but rather a matter of administration. Through his
emphasis on organization, Lenin came to limit the terrain
of the political by extending the sphere of the adminis-
trative. Though the state was theoretically to be "wither-
ing away", its domain was in fact being greatly extended.
What Is to Be Done ? (published in 1902) Lenin asked
the following question of the proletariat class in Tsarist
Russia
:
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hy do the Russian workers still manifest littlerevolutionary activity in response to the brutaltreatment of the people by the police, the per-secution of religious sects,
... the outrageous
censorship,
... the persecution of the most in-nocent cultural undertakings, etc.'^SS
The question seems even more appropriate today. Political
dissidents are routinely locked away for years in institu-
tions for the insane, Russian Jews are denied emigration and
claim discrimination in other ways, art festivals are bull-
dozed in Moscow. Can these incidents be traced directly
to Lenin s theory of the party and organization? What of
Stalin and his reign of terror which perverted the demo-
cratic aspect of democratic centralism? Is not Stalin the
real villain?
Stalin, it seems to me, is too easily labeled the cul-
in Soviet history. Though Lenin was most likely more
sincere in his claims of being a democrat, it was also Lenin
who stated that "my idea ... is that the Party is built from
the top downwards". Ideological unity was of indisputable
necessity. Lenin spoke of "voluntary centralism". Yet, if
that was not forthcoming centralism was still demanded, be
it voluntary or not. Certainly Lenin never made power as
personal as did Stalin, but his party structure made such
control possible. Political debate became more than a nui-
sance, it became treasonous. Failure to submit to the party
line constituted a seditious act.
Though open political discussion was to be preserved
within the party, it was never greatly encouraged. Higher
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cells were independent of lower cells (with the exception
that higher cells were to be elected by subordinate cells)
,
the central Committee being the supreme authoritative body.
Thus, input to decisions did not flow upward, but were en-
forced from above. Political responsibility to the public
was dependent on the individual bureaucrat - no real po-
litical restraints were put on the highest administrative
committees
.
Although Lenin looked to organization to save the
democratic revolution, his excessive dependence on it smoth-
ered political vitality in Russia. Having theoretically
created a nation united ideologically, politics was reduced
to a matter of administration, and "political" questions
became the exclusive domain of central party organs.
One may be tempted to distinguish between the struc-
ture of the Bolshevik party in a revolutionary period (with
its particular demands) from its organization in a socialist,
post-revolutionary society. After all, in a military-like
operation such as revolution, military-like discipline and
strong organization can be an important advantage. As trade
unions sacrificed long-range political and economic freedom
and equality for short-term economic concessions, Lenin
argued, so too would social-democratic political parties
consign themselves to perpetual failure and repression at
the hands of bourgeois ideology and autocratic political
power if they continued to clamor for "'broad democracy' ...
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^ and harmful toy" ^^ in party organization. Once
having created the revolution, however, one could argue that
democracy would finally have become possible.
Lenin himself did not make this argument, and for good
reason. Adhering to his own particular brand of Marxism,
Lenin felt that political authority derived not from popular
approval, but from allegiance to "Marxist" ideology. Though
he points to the democratic aspects of "democratic centralism"
,
one must note that where politics has become a "science",
democracy becomes of little concern. Lenin's democracy was
much more interested in economic equality than in assurance
of political liberties.
Political life was redefined in terms which denied
popular participation. Though Stalin brutalized Russian
political life, Lenin had set the stage by so emasculating it.
Stalin extended the iron-fisted discipline of the revolution-
ary party to the Communist Party. In his book Foundations of
Leninism
,
Stalin commented on Lenin's calls for "military-
like discipline" and the "consistent application of the prin-
ciple of organization" by writing:
This is the position in regard to discipline in
the party in the period of struggle preceding the
achievement of the dictatorship (i.e., rigid dis-
cipline) .
The same, but to an even greater degree
,
(em-
phasis added) must be said about discipline in the
party after the dictatorship has been achieved. 88
Perhaps had Lenin lived longer the course of Soviet history
would be much different. It is not inconceivable, however.
that it would be much the same.
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Though other questions raised by Lenin — the value
of trade unionism, the limitations of democratic reform, the
role of the state, etc. -- suggest ideas which can prove
stimulating to democratic thought, his conception of the
party has little to recommend itself to those who seek an
open political society. its excessive centralization crip-
ples free discussion and the open exchange of ideas, re-
serving political power for administrative authority. Rath-
er than the "withering away" of the state, Lenin's party
introduces a more total and undemocratic state power. Why,
indeed, do Russian workers not react to state oppression?
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